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Abstract: This dissertation consists of three research articles investigating three 
related research questions about entrepreneurial ecosystems and the career and location 
transitions of technology entrepreneurs. Altogether, the analyses improve our 
understanding of how particular work experiences and skills can shape the career paths of 
entrepreneurs and executives and how certain locations are consistently better at 
retaining/attracting entrepreneurial talent. The first article explores the common career 
paths of entrepreneurs, executives, and senior managers in the high-tech industry. I build 
career trajectories (as network graphs) that provide insights on career paths of 
entrepreneurs, executives, and senior managers based on a large dataset of work histories. 
Focusing on the high-tech industry, I find that individuals with certain transferable 
skills—notably technical, management, mixed, and boundary-spanning experience—are 
more likely to be in position to capitalize on job opportunities across industries. 
Furthermore, I test these insights by developing and refining a supervised learning model 
for predicting individual career transitions. In the second article, I investigate why certain 
U.S. metropolitan areas are better able to retain and attract technology entrepreneurs. 
Placing the entrepreneur at the center of the analysis, I examine the role of regional 
economic factors, regional funding opportunities, and personal social networks on 
 vii 
entrepreneur decisions to start a high-tech firm in a specific location. The third article 
investigates the entrepreneurial ecosystems of Silicon Valley, Austin, Boston, and New 
York, which are well-established innovation-centered business clusters and 
entrepreneurial “talent magnets”. Following a brief overview and history of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystems of each region, I specify models (for each region) testing the 
importance of social network ties, funding, education, and cumulative work experience in 
driving the entrepreneurs’ location choice decisions. I supplement the empirical findings 
by analyzing interview data collected from technology entrepreneurs to explain how 
particular structures within entrepreneurial ecosystems facilitate interaction and 
networking among entrepreneurs—offering potential explanations for some of the 
observed variation between regions. 
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Chapter 1: “Which Way I Ought to Go?” Career Trajectories of 
Entrepreneurs, Executives, and Senior Managers in High-Tech 
 
This paper analyzes 67,000 career profiles from a popular social networking platform. I 
build career trajectories (as network graphs) that provide insights on career paths of 
entrepreneurs, executives, and senior managers. In these career trajectory graphs, each node is a 
job consisting of an industry-level and seniority-level classification. Focusing on high-tech 
industry, I find that individuals with certain transferable skills — notably technical, management, 
mixed, and boundary-spanning experience — are more likely to be in position to capitalize on 
job opportunities across industries. Furthermore, I test these insights by developing and refining 
a supervised learning model for predicting individual career transitions of 10,000 individuals and 
achieve 48% accuracy for 204 job choices. Managerially, these insights can help in recruitment, 




“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?" 
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to." 
"I don't much care where –" 
"Then it doesn't matter which way you go.” 
― Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland 
  
Feelings of career uncertainty are well-documented by many recent college graduates and 
current workers in the labor force. In a recent survey of working U.S. adults, 58% of all 
respondents, and 73% of working professions in their 30s, expressed interest in changing careers 
(McLaughlin 2015). Some of the top reasons given for this interest include feeling “burned out” 
or the loss of passion in their current field, not making enough money, and the lack of 
opportunity for advancement in their current field. This should be a major concern among 
managers because this suggests a mismatch between the occupational career goals and ambitions 
of employees and the job responsibilities they currently occupy. This mismatch fosters worker 
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dissatisfaction, which is associated with lower productivity and higher turnover (Lee, Carswell 
and Allen 2000). 
Most professionals would benefit from advice in identifying the career choices to achieve 
a specific career goal. Almost every professional is asked about his/her five (or ten) year plan 
during interviews and over the course of their corporate tenure. This is an extremely complex 
and difficult question for young professionals, who lack information on how their prospective 
experiences will shape future career opportunities. Thus, a more complete understanding of 
career dynamics based on career transitions is important from different perspectives. It can help 
job seekers identify career transitions within a five (ten) year window that are positively 
associated with desirable career goals. It can help employers identify candidates that are likely to 
have the skills for the next job and potentially reduce costly job turnover. It can help 
policymakers better understand shifts in the labor market and develop policies to encourage 
better alignment of skills and industry needs in the workplace.  
Currently, we lack the tools that connect career goals and outcomes with the discrete 
career steps that increase the likelihood of achieving those outcomes. From the workers’ 
perspective, it would be helpful to know the most common career paths taken by those 
executives, entrepreneurs, and senior managers, so they can align their work experiences and 
skills with the job outcomes they wish to achieve. For those that have lost passion or feel they 
cannot advance further in their current field, it would helpful to know what career steps they 
should take to reach new career goals in other fields, without starting over at the bottom of the 
career ladder. Current employees are unlikely to share newly developed career goals in other 
fields with human resources or other personnel inside the organization, because it could 
adversely impact personal relations or treatment in the near term—before the individual is ready 
to make the career transition.  
Career counseling or “coaching” is the main resource available to individuals seeking 
advancement towards career goals. Career coaching involves an assessment of a person’s 
strengths and weakness, job preferences, values, interests, and personal life concerns, and then 
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evaluating compatible work opportunities both within and outside the current organization 
(Feldman 2001). While there are studies that establish the plausible benefits of career coaching 
on worker satisfaction and performance, there are also many weaknesses and potential 
downsides. For example, many career coaches rely on imperfect coaching heuristics that are 
subject to individual biases based on their stock of experiences with clients. Also, many coaches 
use a battery psychometric tools (e.g., Myers-Briggs Type Indicator) (Kennedy and Kennedy 
2004), which are problematic when used as the primary basis for making recommendations on 
career choices (Tieger, Barron and Tieger 2014). These psychometric assessments can 
oversimplify a person’s compatibility with a career choice and create biased preconceptions and 
entrench idiosyncratic judgments the coach or client makes about his/her abilities and 
preferences regarding career choices (Rynes, Giluk and Brown 2007). Furthermore, career 
coaches do not have tools that directly address questions regarding the various paths an 
individual can take to reach career outcomes or goals. To improve career management, there 
have been calls for analysis of longitudinal data on individuals’ job- and industry-switching 
histories to improve our understanding of associations and mechanisms underlying career 
transitions (Kim et al. 2014). 
Many scholars have focused on identifying patterns in workers transitions into and within 
the labor market (Fallick, Fleischman and Rebitzer 2006, Joseph et al. 2012, Scherer 2001). The 
structure and mechanisms of job transitions is closely associated with intergenerational social 
mobility and inequality (Blau and Duncan 1967, Rosenfeld 1992). As prior work documents, the 
economic environment and market forces have eroded the traditional conception of 
organizational careers, where individuals follow relatively discrete, linear transitions within one 
or two organizations (Bidwell and Briscoe 2010, Rosenbaum 1979). The rise of novel career 
paths lead to notion of “boundaryless” careers, where worker careers bounce around between 
multiple positions within multiple organizations (DeFillippi and Arthur 1996, Greenhaus, 
Callanan and DiRenzo 2008, Joseph et al. 2012).  
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This broader variance among career trajectories, combined with the proliferation of job 
titles, roles, and responsibilities makes pattern detection among job transition sequences 
notoriously difficult (Abbott and Hrycak 1990). Mimno and McCallum (2008) propose a topical 
sequence model of career path trajectories based on latent topics detected in the components of 
job descriptions on resumes. I build on this earlier research by investigating a large volume of 
digital user-reported career profiles available on social networking platforms. I utilize network 
methods for visualizing and finding patterns in aggregated career trajectories and refine a 
supervised learning method to increase prediction accuracy for subsequent career transitions. 
Big data introduces a new resource for identifying particular career paths associated with 
particular career outcomes. Identifying these career paths is really an empirical question. That is, 
individuals that reach particular career outcomes (e.g. CEOs, senior managers, entrepreneurs) 
transitioned from a sequence of prior work experiences. We know these paths exist because we 
have the aggregate data that shows what job transitions people have made over their career. 
These lead to the core research question: what career transition insights can we observe from big 
data? Moreover, as a way of empirically testing these observed insights, can we use those 
transition patterns to predict individual career outcomes?  
Data constraints have prevented research from finding patterns and drawing generalizable 
insights based on individual work histories. Finding insights from work histories requires a large 
volume of individual careers, because small samples will suffer from selection bias, which 
weakens the generalizability of the insights. Individual work history data is very difficult and 
costly of obtain via traditional survey collection. However, a significant portion of the labor 
force now reports individual career histories on work-related social networking platforms (e.g., 
LinkedIn, XING, Viadeo). Career profiles on social networking platforms provide both the scale 
and granular job transition details to investigate patterns in occupational mobility of careers like 
entrepreneurs, executives, and senior managers. Even with career data available on individual 
profiles, large scale collection of individual public profiles is extremely difficult. To my 
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knowledge, this is the first study to use big data from a career networking platform for career 
transition insights and large scale predictive analysis of individual career paths. 
This paper has two main objectives. First, I analyze a large volume of data, available in 
the form of online career profiles on a social networking platform, to find and explain common 
patterns in career trajectories for entrepreneurs, executives, and persons in senior-level roles 
within firms. Second, I test the observed insights by developing a model for predicting career 
choices of individuals. I build career trajectories of individuals as a network graph where each 
node is a job consisting of an industry-level and seniority-level classification. I combine the 
graphs for each individual to build an aggregate career transition matrix for each of the preferred 
career outcomes (entrepreneur, executive, senior management, senior technical staff). I then 
develop and refine supervised learning method to increase prediction accuracy. In this study, I 
focus entirely on the insights from career transition networks for people who listed their last 
career in high-tech entrepreneurship, executive, or a senior management/technical role. 
BACKGROUND LITERATURE AND THEORY 
Many scholars in the social sciences have studied work, occupations, and individual 
careers. Early studies often focused on career paths within particular occupations (Becker 1952, 
Hall 1948) and organizational careers (Vroom and Maccrimmon 1968), emphasizing the 
relatively linear progressions among professional careers. Later, scholars recognized that a 
significant portion of individual careers were highly disordered, even among professional 
occupations (Evans and Laumann 1983). Shifting focus, many studies explored occupational 
mobility and the relation between inter-organizational or inter-occupational career transitions and 
changes in social status (prestige) (Kalleberg and Hudis 1979). White (1970) demonstrated the 
link between individual careers and organizational structure, inspiring a range of formal models 
of organizational mobility (Rosenbaum 1979, Stewman and Konda 1983). Recognizing the 
complex sequencing of most individual careers, most studies in the career literature did not 
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consider the influence of prior sequencing of jobs in an individual’s work history on the future 
career transitions or career outcomes (Leung 2014). 
Opportunity structures and skill transferability 
Opportunity structures in the labor market is a key factor that drives people to switch 
from one industry to another. In the last few decades, certain industries have experienced more 
job growth than others. Figure 1 shows the indexed employment growth for various industries in 
the United States. Since 2000, education and health services have maintained the largest 
employment growth of any industry and they are the only industries to continue to grow through 
the 2008 recession caused by the financial crisis. Other industries with strong growth since 2000 
include computer and mathematical occupations, leisure and hospitality (e.g., arts, media, 
entertainment, recreation), and professional and business services. There has been slight 
employment growth in the finance and legal services and negative growth in information 
services, at least in part due to expanding scope of automation (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2011). 
In a stylized labor market, individual career transitions are in part shaped by this variation in 
industry growth as individuals seek out job opportunities that offer better compensation and 
prospects for further advancement as they gain experience. The faster growing industries 
providing more attractive career opportunities, while lower growth industries offer more 





Figure 1: Indexed Employment Growth by Industry (1999-2017) (Index=1999) 
In addition to the career opportunities enabled by structural changes in the labor market, 
individual career choices are shaped by the transferability of their skills and knowledge acquired 
through education and work experience (Bidwell and Briscoe 2010). Many studies have 
examined isolated career transitions, particularly related to job turnover within an organization. 
For example, past literature has shown high rates of turnover among IT jobs (Tambe and Hitt 
2013) and identified several factors influencing this turnover including job satisfaction, 
organizational commitment, human capital, intrinsic motivation, external labor market 
conditions, boundary-spanning activities, and low promotability (Joseph et al. 2007).  
Recently, MacCrory, Choudhary and Pinsonneault (2016) focused on boundary-spanning 
roles and infrequent intra-firm promotability as key factors for IT professionals frequently 
switching jobs, suggesting firms can reduce turnover by offering frequent and small promotion 
ladders. Boundary-spanning activities are a key factor explaining frequent job transitions because 
activities in these roles require a broader skillset, including the knowledge, technical abilities, 
and domain-specific language associated with different departments (fields) (Joseph et al. 2012). 
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Since these boundary-spanning duties are critical to the firm, these roles have some degree of 
power (Baroudi and Igbaria 1994) but can also be highly stressful (Kahn et al. 1964) and, in turn, 
promote turnover. Thus, persons in boundary-spanning roles have more transferable skills that 
are valued by many departments and organizations, including those in different industries. This 
insight has fueled the notion of “boundaryless” careers, in which workers with transferable skills 
jump around between multiple positions within multiple organizations (DeFillippi and Arthur 
1996, Greenhaus, Callanan and DiRenzo 2008, Joseph et al. 2012). Workers develop portable 
identities around their repertoire of skills and abilities, which they can deploy over time across a 
wide range of organizations and job responsibilities (Petriglieri, Petriglieri and Wood 2017). 
While other types of jobs may also perform boundary-spanning activities, many IT and 
other technical/analytical roles are associated with this kind of boundary-spanning work. 
Technical skills such as computer programming, database management, and data analytics are 
highly transferable in the modern information economy. Firm demand for individuals with 
technical skills has steadily increased (Campbell et al. 2012, Ganco, Ziedonis and Agarwal 
2015). For example, based on data from the online job search website Indeed.com, since 2013, 
the portion of U.S. jobs requiring skills involving artificial intelligence as increased by a factor 
of 4.5 (aiindex.org). Thus, when considering entire sequences of career trajectories, one would 
expect to see technical staff transitioning to different industries, capitalizing on their transferable 
skillset. 
The benefits of a broader, more generalized skillset may apply to areas other than 
technical or STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) related skills and 
fields. While majors from STEM fields yield predictably higher lifetime earning potential 
relative to majors in the humanities and liberal arts, there are large variations in earning potential 
both within and between majors. Among individuals with more ability in the upper quarter of the 
lifetime earning distribution, the earnings of some broader, non-STEM degrees (e.g., economics, 
political science) are actually near or higher than some highly specialized degrees/professions 
(e.g., accounting, computer science, electrical engineering) (Selingo 2017, Webber 2016). Other 
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recent work suggests the importance of broader social skills in career advancement. In the last 
few decades, the economy yielded higher job growth in occupations that require higher levels of 
social interaction and stagnated growth in technical work requiring high degrees of analytical 
and mathematical reasoning, but low levels of social interaction (Deming 2017). Overall, this 
suggests there are real benefits to acquiring a broad range of knowledge and skills through 
education and work experiences. A broader range of knowledge and experiences enables 
individuals to take advantage of job opportunities in other industries or organizations. 
There are many studies connecting individuals with broader skillsets, with 
entrepreneurship or self-employment (Stenard and Sauermann 2016). Prior work suggests that 
many entrepreneurs are “jacks-of-all-trades” with skills and competencies in many areas, rather 
than being an elite expert in a narrow area (Lazear 2004). This makes sense because most new 
ventures do not have the capital to pay a large number of employees for specialized expertise. 
Thus many entrepreneurs must perform a wide range of job responsibilities including 
management, sales, accounting, marketing, product development, human resources, and many 
others—in addition to their central responsibilities developing and implementing the business 
strategy and acquiring and managing investors. Lazear (2004) finds that this generalist 
entrepreneurial skillset is derived, in part, from more varied curriculum during college.  
This balanced entrepreneurial skillset can also be acquired through varied work 
experiences throughout a career (Åstebro and Thompson 2011, Wagner 2003). Åstebro and 
Thompson (2011) find that individuals with a wide range of work experiences from a career 
history of frequent job-hopping are more likely to become an entrepreneur. Additionally, this 
high frequency job-switching among entrepreneurs is associated with higher earnings (Campbell 
et al. 2012), although the association does not hold for non-self-employed wage earners. In the 
analysis of entrepreneur work histories, I look for variation in the past work experiences for 
individuals who become startup entrepreneurs. Specifically, I look for variation in the industries 
and job responsibilities of entrepreneur career paths. Both of these factors facilitate the 
expansion and variation of an individual’s skillset, as they must adjust their work activities to 
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suit the industry and job requirements of each position. The more varied exposure should lead to 
a more general skillset associated with entrepreneurial activity. 
However, it is not clear this generalizable skillset is applicable for the creation of high 
tech startups. The “jack-of-all-trades” model of entrepreneurship was developed mostly around 
examining non-high-tech entrepreneurial ventures. As Lazear notes, most entrepreneurs are non-
technically skilled individuals starting firms in non-technical fields (Lazear 2004, p.1). Many of 
the more recent startups have a large technical component central to the business plan. While 
some technology ventures are launched in the high tech industry, many others are focused 
around a new technology in a non-technical field (e.g., Uber in the transportation industry). 
While it is plausible that entrepreneurs still need to have a balance skillset, it is also plausible 
that high tech entrepreneurs need to be technically skilled—with expertise in a particular domain, 
application, or technology (Ganco 2013). For example, Mark Zuckerberg, founder and CEO of 
Facebook, is a highly skilled computer programmer and all his work and academic experiences 
prior to launching Facebook involved expert-level technical skills. Thus, I will investigate 
whether high tech entrepreneurs tend to have more technical backgrounds or more varied 
background in terms of responsibilities and industries. 
Moreover, it is unclear whether entrepreneurs can acquire management skills through a 
broader range of work experience (Cooper and Dunkelberg 1986). At least at the beginning, 
many entrepreneurs are executives within their new venture, in addition to being the founder. 
Some prior work suggests that the skills and competencies that make individuals good founders 
may not translate to management or executive positions. Some research based on workplace 
surveys shows that founder CEOs are rated as the worst managers of companies by a significant 
margin (Bennett, Lawrence and Sadun 2016). Also, VC firms and private equity firms often 
replace founders with professional managers (Hellmann and Puri 2002) and other research shows 
that firm performance actually improves when VCs replace founders with a hand-picked CEO 
(Ewens and Marx 2017). There are many factors that might explain why good founders are not 
always good managers. Ewens and Marx (2017) suggests one factor is that founder CEOs are not 
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fully aware of their weaknesses as managers and consistently overestimate how well managed 
their firm is. The analysis investigates the prior work experience of entrepreneurs. Consistent 
with this prior work, entrepreneurs without management experience in their career path may 
have management gaps that lead to their removal. Thus entrepreneurs’ may transition to another  
position (perhaps another founder position). Conversely, some entrepreneurs might have 
management experience in their prior work and thus are more likely to remain as a founder CEO 
as their final job. 
Turning to executive and management roles, there is some evidence that management 
skills require a general management skillset cultivated from prior work experiences. Research 
finds that the career paths of many Fortune 100 CEOs focus on acquiring general management 
experience through steady internal promotions and few inter-industry transitions (Koch, Forgues 
and Monties 2017). Some research suggests there are foundational elements to good 
management practices that nearly all successful managers must perform. For example, the World 
Management Survey (WMS) outlines 3 general areas that are core to good management: 
monitoring, setting targets, and incentives/people management. Good managers promote 
practices that collect information about intra-firm activity and use that information to make 
improvements. Managers set targets, track outcomes, and make adjustments to better align 
targets with outcomes. Managers also institute practices for selecting, evaluating, and rewarding 
employees based on performance. In short, high-quality management skills involve knowledge 
and practice about clear managerial objectives. Over their careers, good managers acquire 
knowledge and experience that enables them to craft practices and strategies for accomplishing 
these objectives.  
Through this view, good management practices are relatively standardized and thus 
highly transferable between industries. Other research indicates that executives with broader 
career experience are more likely to benefit from executive job searches and pursue positions in 
other organizations or industries (Cappelli and Hamori 2014). Thus, one might expect to see 
large volumes of inter-industry transitions at the executive and senior management level as 
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industries compete for the highest quality managers who can easily transfer their managerial 
practices. However, a bulk of career transitions occur within an industry, and many open jobs are 
filled by intra-organizational hires (Keller 2017). Other research indicates that, for executive 
careers, transitions to jobs with greater pay and managerial responsibility/seniority are often 
intra-organizational transitions, while external moves often provide similar pay increases but 
lack career advancement regarding managerial responsibilities (Bidwell and Mollick 2015). 
Thus, one would expect to see inter-industry transitions involving positions with equal 
responsibility/seniority. 
However, some prior work suggests there is a large variation in the practices of head 
managers (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007). This research posits management practices are heavily 
shaped by industry and firm characteristics (Hermalin 1994), psychological traits (Galasso and 
Simcoe 2011), and “stylistic” preferences of the firm’s CEO (Bertrand and Schoar 2003), among 
other factors. This indicates that one might observe less industry variation in past work 
experience among those that become executives or senior managers.  However, individual and 
stylistic differences among managers suggests we could see more variation in the job-related 
responsibilities of prior work experiences of individuals who become executives.  
Operationalizing career paths 
Abbott and Hrycak (1990) suggest that both theoretical insights and methodological 
challenges have largely discouraged scholars from analyzing careers as continuous sequences of 
events (transitions). Theoretically, the structural view of individual careers indicates that 
transitions are largely influenced by structural conditions (e.g., job vacancies, organizational 
demographics, industry-specific labor market factors), thus the sequencing of individual job 
transitions is basically random and largely inconsequential. Other research shows that the timing 
and duration of work experiences and schedules, which individuals have no control over, can 
consequentially influence future career decisions, even after controlling for individual and career 
option attributes (Shah et al. 2014). 
 
 13 
Although acknowledging the merit of structural view, the agency view contends that 
individuals consciously develop plans and shape their work trajectories in response to structural 
constraints. Thus, from the vantage of the individual, there is a coherent and discernible logic to 
their career sequence. Furthermore, future job sequencing is, at least in part, influenced by prior 
job history because individuals create their own futures based on established and culturally 
acceptable career models (Bertaux 1982). Thus, individuals tend to shape their career paths to 
match the patterns of familiar careers that have work histories similar to their own histories 
(Abbott and Hrycak 1990). Methodologically, although there are established methods for 
analyzing isolated job transitions, career outcomes, and status attainment, there is no standard 
procedure for analyzing entire career trajectories of sequenced jobs.  
More recently, studies have used Optimal matching analysis (OMA) to investigate 
holistic career trajectories and detect patterns among those sequences (Abbott and Hrycak 1990, 
Abbott and Tsay 2000, Dlouhy and Biemann 2015, Koch, Forgues and Monties 2017). OMA 
was most commonly used in the natural sciences to find similarities between proteins or DNA 
sequences, but the approach has since gained traction among the social sciences. The underlying 
logic of OMA is to measure the difference between two or more sequences in terms of counting 
the number of substitutions, insertions, and deletions that are required to transform one sequence 
into another. Next, these measures of difference are fed into clustering algorithms which yield 
information on “typical” patterns of sequences (Abbott and Hrycak 1990). In short, the 
sequences that require the fewest changes (substitutions, insertions and deletions) before 
becoming identical sequences are grouped together as a distinct pattern. For example, Chan 
(1995) used OMA to identify four distinct career paths in Hong Kong’s service class. Using 
OMA, Joseph, Boh, Ang, and Slaughter (2012) identify objective career histories, mobility 
patterns, and career success of individuals working in the information technology field.  
Most of the studies on career trajectories using OMA have relied on survey data with a 
limited sample size. I develop and refine an alternative procedure for analyzing career 
trajectories based on network and clustering techniques, which also enables prediction of career 
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outcomes based on prior work history sequencing. The next section describes the data collection 
and classification process for the job histories, before detailing the procedure for predicting 
career outcomes. 
DATA AND CLASSIFICATION  
To model individual career paths, I constructed a database of worker employment 
histories using individual LinkedIn profiles. I randomly sampled 67,000 individual profiles, 
which contained self-reported job histories that included job titles, job descriptions, company 
names, and dates. The individual job histories consisted of 427,054 total jobs (average 6.37 jobs 
per person). The key challenge with this data source is converting the non-standardized, self-
reported job titles and descriptions into meaningful categories. 
Next, because LinkedIn user job histories are filled with non-standardized job titles, I 
grouped the job titles into industry categories using different classification techniques. First, I 
used approximate string or “fuzzy” matching to classify the user reported job titles into 
standardized job categories provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). This procedure 
computes the Levenshtein distance between the normalized word stems of the self-reported job 
title with the normalized word stems from every BLS job category. This distance is the number 
of single character edits it would take to transform the self-reported title into the BLS title—and 
the self-reported title is categorized based on the shortest distance. While this technique 
accurately classified many of the self-reported titles, the Levenshtein distance was excessively 
high for many of the self-reported titles, yielding too many errors for manual classification 
adjustments.  
Second, I employed a third-party machine learning classifier to organize job titles and 
descriptions into 2 levels of standardized industry categories, an industry-level group and sub-
industry group (Monkeylearn 2016). There are 17 industry-level categories and 36 sub-industry 
categories. The third-party classifier was specifically designed to classify professional profiles 
(e.g. LinkedIn), including company names, jobs titles, and job descriptions, using deep learning 
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based on training data that consists of tens of thousands of LinkedIn profiles. Overall, the 
classifier yielded an average probability of 0.65 for the classification accuracy of main industry-
level category. After inspecting the classification outputs from the fuzzy matching method and 
the trained industry classifier, it was clear the industry classifier had performed much better, 
yielding the fewest classification errors. However, to further reduce the number of industry 
classification errors, I manually reviewed all the industry classifications with a probability below 
0.40 to fix any obvious industry classification errors. 
Lastly, I used heuristics, based on seniority keywords, to categorize the seniority level of 
each self-reported job title into 12 seniority-levels. Based on the prior work suggesting the 
potential transferability of technical or analytical skills (Tambe and Hitt 2013), I developed 
particular heuristics to distinguish technical staff-level and technical senior staff-level positions 
from other staff and senior staff positions. In table 1, I reported the 12 seniority-levels and the 





Frequency Distribution of the Seniority-level of Terminal Jobs 
Seniority-level 
categories 
Most common job titles Freq. Perc. 
Executive president, CEO, CTO, director, vice president 17697 26.4
% 
Staff Consultant; sales (associate, representative); assistant 





Manager; project manager; account manager; product 
manager 
6258 9.3% 





Founder; cofounder; founder and CEO 5828 8.7% 
Management 
(senior) 
Senior project manager; managing director; managing 
partner 
4009 6.0% 
Staff (technical) software engineer/developer; programmer; engineer; 




senior software engineer/developer; senior engineer; 




Owner; freelance (writer, designer, consultant, 
photographer, journalist) 
1905 2.8% 
Other (mentor, board 
member) 
Board member; advisor; mentor 1904 2.8% 
Intern-student intern; student; summer intern; research intern 1574 2.3% 
Other (non-tech) Member; volunteer 427 0.6% 
  67000 100% 
Table 1: Frequency Distribution of the Seniority-level of Terminal Jobs 
In this study, I focused extracting transition insights based on joint industry-level and 
seniority-level career transitions, which enabled us to investigate inter-industry transitions, as 
well as seniority transitions. Thus, each job was classified into one of 204 joint category-
seniority groups. 
Pared (backbone) aggregate network graphs 
In order to observe common transition patterns associated with particular career 
outcomes, I created network graphs of the aggregated careers paths, based on each individual’s 
terminal job. Projecting career paths as network graphs helps visualize which fields have more 
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opportunities and which skills are more transferable. I created 204 aggregate matrices (H) for 
each of the 204 job classifications (v) that were the terminal job in an individual’s career path. I 
constructed each aggregate matrix (Hv) by combining all normalized individual job transition 
graphs (G), where edges in the graph represented job transitions and the edge weight (thickness) 
represented the normalized job tenure in the job to which the transition was made. Each network 
graph presented is an aggregated matrix (Hv), which allows us to visualize and explore patterns 
in the career transitions for each of the 204 job classifications. 
I created aggregate career path matrices based on the joint industry and seniority level of 
the individual's final job, and then graphed the matrices to visualize patterns in the career 
transitions. In each directed network graph (Figures 2-4), the thickness of a given edge (i,j) 
connecting two nodes (jobs) is weighted by the sum of normalized job tenure of all the 
individuals who made the transition from i to j and the arrow indicates the direction of the 
transition. Because of the volume of career transitions, the full aggregate career path networks 
need to be pared down to observe the “backbones” or dominant paths within the network. I used 
edge weight filters to keep the connected subgraphs for the highest 10% of edge weights. 
To get a sense of the career paths in the database, Table 2 shows the frequency 
distribution of the seniority-level of the terminal jobs. The most common terminal jobs for 
individuals in the database are executive and staff positions, each capturing roughly a quarter of 
terminal jobs. While the large number of executives suggests that the database possibly 
oversamples more accomplished individuals, the large number of staff positions suggests the 
sample is still balanced with ordinary employees within firms. In the analysis, I first examine the 
backbone career path networks for entrepreneurs (startups), executives, and senior management. 
Next, I explore transition patterns by industry, focusing on the backbone career path networks for 





Frequency Distribution of the Industry of Terminal Jobs 
Industry Freq. Perc. 
High Tech 19993 29.8% 
Corporate 6638 9.9% 
Finance 6573 9.8% 
Educational 5178 7.7% 
Media 5047 7.5% 
Arts 3896 5.8% 
Medical 3415 5.1% 
Manufacturing 3230 4.8% 
Recreational 2225 3.3% 
Non-profit 2130 3.2% 
Legal 2089 3.1% 
Consumer Goods 1912 2.9% 
Construction 1303 1.9% 
Service 1274 1.9% 
Government 1209 1.8% 
Transportation 788 1.2% 
Agriculture 102 0.2% 
 67000 100% 
Table 2: Frequency Distribution of the Industry of Terminal Jobs 
Approximately 30% of the careers in the database reported that their last transition was to 
the high tech industry, which was highest among all industries. Although online career social 
networking sites are a useful tool for employees of all industries, these new tools are heavily 
used in technology and other digitally focused sectors. Thus it is not surprising that the high tech 
industry is strongly represented in the database. Other than high tech, the most common 
industries of the terminal jobs for individuals were corporate, finance, and education (see Table 
2). Although I focus on the high tech sector, I also make comparisons with other industries (e.g., 
corporate, finance, media) to show how some career transition patterns are distinct within the 
high tech field. Specifically, I investigate patterns in the high tech sector to explore associations 
between technical skills and inter-industry transitions, extending prior work on skill 
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transferability in the IT sector (Tambe and Hitt, 2013). While I detail many insights yielded from 
these career transition networks by industry, Table 3 lists the most common transitions for 




Most Common Job Transitions by Industry-Seniority Outcomes 
Outcome Common Transitions 
High Tech-entrep-startup Hi-ts, [Hi-ts, Hi-jm, Hi-ex], Me-en, Cor-en, Ar-en, Ed-en, [Hi-ts, Hi-s], 
[Hi-ts, Hi-jm], [Hi-ts, Hi-sts], Fi-en 
High Tech-executive [Hi-ts, Hi-jm], Cor-ex, Me-ex, [Hi-ts, Hi-jm, Hi-sm], Hi-ss, [Hi-ts, Hi-
sts], Fi-ex, [Hi-ts, Hi-en] 
High Tech-management-
senior 
[Hi-ts, Hi-jm], [Hi-ts, Hi-sts], [Hi-ts, Hi-ss], [Hi-jm, Hi-ex], Hi-ts, Cor-
sm, Me-sm 
Corporate-entrep-startup Cor-ex, Me-en, No-en, Hi-en, Cor-s, Fi-ex, Fi-en, CG-en, Me-ex, Ar-en   




Cor-jm, Cor-ss, [Cor-jm, Cor-ex], Me-sm, Hi-jm, Cor-s, Hi-sm, Le-sm 
Finance-entrep-startup Fi-ex, [Fi-ts, Fi-s], Fi-jm, Cor-en, Hi-en, Ed-en, Fi-ss, Hi-ex 
Finance-executive Fi-s, Fi-sm, Fi-jm, [Fi-s, Fi-ss], Cor-ex, [Fi-s, Fi-jm], Le-ex, Me-ex, Hi-
ex 
Finance-management-senior [Fi-s, Fi-ex], [Fi-s, Fi-ss], [Fi-ts, Fi-s], Fi-jm, Fi-ts, Le-sm, Cor-sm 
Educational-entrep-startup [Ed-s, Ed-ex], Se-en, Hi-en, No-vol, Ed-vol, Ed-s, Go-en, No-en, Le-
en, Ed-jm, Se-ex 
Educational-executive Ed-s, [Ed-s, Ed-vol], No-ex, Se-ex, Me-ex, Md-ex, Ed-ss, Hi-ex 
Educational-management-
senior 
[Ed-ex, Me-sm], Cor-ex, Ed-ss, Fi-sm, Hi-ex, Ed-ex 
Media-entrep-startup [Me-ss, Me-ex], Hi-en, Ar-en, Me-s, [Me-s, Me-jm], Fi-en, Ed-en, Hi-
ex, Me-i, 
Media-executive Me-s, Me-jm, Cor-ex, Hi-ex, Ar-ex, Me-ss, Me-en, Fi-ex, Ed-ex, Hi-ss 
Media-management-senior [Me-s, Me-ex], Me-jm, Me-ss, Hi-sm, Hi-ex, Ar-ss, Me-s, Le-sm, Hi-
jm  
Arts-entrep-startup Ar-ex, [Ar-s, Ar-vol], Me-ex, Me-en, Ed-en, Hi-en, Se-en, [Me-s, Ar-
s], Ar-ss 
Arts-executive Me-ex, [Ar-s, Ar-esp], Ed-ex, Ar-s, Re-ex, Ar-ss, Se-ex, Ar-en 
Arts-management-senior Re-sm, Ar-ex, Ma-s, Ar-s, [Ar-vol, Ar-ss], [Ar-jm, Me-sm], [Ar-vol, 
Ar-jm], Cor-sm 
Medical-entrep-startup Md-ex, Ed-en, Le-ex, Hi-en, Se-en, Se-s, Me-s, No-ss, No-sm 
Medical-executive Ed-ex, Md-s, No-ex, [Md-s, Md-vol], Cor-ex, Md-ss, Ma-ex, Hi-ex, Se-
ex, Md-jm 
Medical-management-senior [Md-ss, Md-ex], Md-ss, Md-jm, Cor-sm, [Md-vol, Md-jm] 
Abbreviations: Arts-entrep-startup: Ar-en, Arts-executive: Ar-ex, Arts-management-senior: Ar-sm, Corporate-entrep-startup: 
Cor-en, Corporate-executive: Cor-ex, Corporate-management-junior: Cor-jm, Corporate-management-senior: Cor-sm, 
Corporate-other-nontech: Cor-vol, Educational-entrep-startup: Ed-en, Educational-executive: Ed-ex, Educational-
management-senior: Ed-sm, Educational-other-nontech: Ed-vol, Finance-entrep-startup: Fi-en, Finance-executive: Fi-ex, , 
Finance-management-senior: Fi-sm, Finance-staff-senior: Fi-ss, High Tech-entrep-startup: Hi-en, High Tech-executive: Hi-ex, 
High Tech-management-junior: Hi-jm, High Tech-management-senior: Hi-sm, High Tech-staff-senior-tech: Hi-sts, Media-
entrep-startup: Me-en, Media-executive: Me-ex, Media-management-senior: Me-sm, Medical-entrep-startup: Md-en, Medical-
executive: Md-ex, Medical-management-senior: Md-sm, Medical-other-nontech: Md-vol, Medical-staff: Md-s 
  
Table 3: Most Common Job Transitions by Industry-Seniority Outcomes 
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RESULTS: TRANSITIONS INSIGHTS IN HIGH TECH INDUSTRY 
Entrepreneurs 
First, I extract insights based on entrepreneurs in the high tech industry. For a job to be 
classified as startup entrepreneur, the job titles had to include “founder” or “co-founder”, 
although many titles included an executive role as well (e.g., “founder and CEO”). High tech 
was the most popular industry among persons whose terminal transition was to entrepreneurship. 
Figure 2 shows the dominant career paths or “network backbones” for individuals whose 
terminal job is high tech entrepreneur. The edge thickness between job categories captures how 
common each pairwise transition was among all high tech entrepreneurs.  
I find that intra-industry transitions are very common and most high tech entrepreneurs 
have some previous work experience using technical skills. The most common transitions are 
from high tech technical staff and high tech executives. Another common path corresponds to a 
technical skills transition to entrepreneurship, as individuals transition from technical staff, to 
senior technical staff, to entrepreneurs. I find that technical work experience is much less 
common for the career paths of entrepreneurs in other industries (e.g. corporate, media, 
education).  The jump from technical staff roles is intuitive, as entrepreneurship in the high tech 
field often involves deep understanding or expertise of a technology, which is facilitated by 
direct training and work experience with a technology as a programmer, engineer, or analyst. 
One potential explanation is that technical staff positions are filled by skilled persons that can 
create the content, infrastructure, or ideas that enables new businesses. Persons transitioning 
from executive roles to entrepreneurship have valuable leadership and management skills and 
have likely pursued some services-oriented venture or are co-founding the new venture with a 
more technically-skilled co-founder.  
Moreover, entrepreneurship is a risky career transition. Most people consider the 
opportunity cost of pursuing new opportunities (Amit, Muller and Cockburn 1995, Reynolds 
1987)—that is, whether the opportunity cost is higher or lower than their current compensation 
and job satisfaction. Thus ambitious and highly skilled lower-level technical staff have lower 
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opportunity costs and might be disproportionally attracted to starting their own high tech venture. 
This tendency is likely exaggerated when there is a mismatch between the individual’s skills and 
abilities and their job responsibilities (Stenard and Sauermann 2016). This mismatch tends to 
result in a poor wage (relative to skills) and in turn encourage worker transition to 
entrepreneurship (Åstebro and Thompson 2011). Additionally, the transition from executive 
roles to entrepreneurship makes sense, in light of prior research showing that the probability of 
creating a new venture is higher if the individual has great capital (Evans and Leighton 1989) or 
more transferable experience (Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg 1989). 
Another one of the more common paths involve a mix of technical and management 
experience, as individuals switch from technical staff, to junior managers, to executives, to 
entrepreneurs. The individuals with both technical and management experience are perhaps best 
suited to be a “jack-of-all-trades” that can handle the many job responsibilities perform by 
founders at the early stages. Regarding management skill transitions, I observe relatively few 
transitions from pure “management tracks” where individuals transition from junior management 
to senior management before launching a new high tech venture. 
Another interesting finding is that the two most common paths to entrepreneurship 
involve short or long paths, suggesting that many entrepreneurs are either younger or older. One 
path involves, a quick jump into entrepreneurship after 1-2 transitions from technical staff or 
staff positions, which likely corresponds to relatively younger entrepreneurs. This path fits the 
popular press depiction of Silicon Valley startups launched by young computer science experts 
(e.g., Mark Zuckerberg, Founder of Facebook at age 20). However, another equally common 
career path involves many career transitions, often involving a mix of technical work, junior 
management positions, and potentially even some executive experience before the individual 
makes jump into entrepreneurship. These individuals are likely middle age industry veterans 
with large stocks of human and social capital accumulated through years of work. This finding 
seems consistent with recent work suggesting that most successful entrepreneurs are middle age 
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(mean age of 42), which contrasts with the public perception of the young and inexperienced 
high tech entrepreneurs in his/her 20s or early 30s (Azoulay et al. 2017). 
I also find that many entrepreneurs are serial entrepreneurs, both within and between 
industries. Among the most common inter-industry transitions, I find that many high tech 
entrepreneurs are serial entrepreneurs transitioning from other industries including media, 
corporate, arts, and education. Looking at entrepreneurs in other industries, I find that many high 







Abbreviations: Arts-entrep-startup: Ar-en, Arts-executive: Ar-ex, Arts-management-senior: Ar-sm, Corporate-
entrep-startup: Cor-en, Corporate-executive: Cor-ex, Corporate-management-junior: Cor-jm, Corporate-
management-senior: Cor-sm, Corporate-other-nontech: Cor-vol, Educational-entrep-startup: Ed-en, Educational-
executive: Ed-ex, Educational-management-senior: Ed-sm, Educational-other-nontech: Ed-vol, Finance-entrep-
startup: Fi-en, Finance-executive: Fi-ex, , Finance-management-senior: Fi-sm, Finance-staff-senior: Fi-ss, High 
Tech-entrep-startup: Hi-en, High Tech-executive: Hi-ex, High Tech-management-junior: Hi-jm, High Tech-
management-senior: Hi-sm, High Tech-staff-senior-tech: Hi-sts, Media-entrep-startup: Me-en, Media-executive: 
Me-ex, Media-management-senior: Me-sm, Medical-entrep-startup: Md-en, Medical-executive: Md-ex, Medical-
management-senior: Md-sm, Medical-other-nontech: Md-vol, Medical-staff: Md-s 
Figure 2: Backbone Aggregate Career Transition Network of High Tech Startup Entrepreneurs 
Executives 
Next, I investigated the aggregate network graph for individuals whose last job was 
executive. The most common job titles for executive positions include CEO or CTO. Overall, 
approximately a quarter of the final jobs in the database were executive jobs and they were 
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largely spread out among industries. Those whose last transition was to executive and/or high-
tech had the largest indegree followed by corporate, media, educational, and finance. 
Figure 3 shows the pared aggregate network graph for individuals whose last job was 
high tech executive. Intra-industry transitions are common among high tech executives and I 
observe that many individuals have prior experience in technically skilled positions. I find the 
most common path involved a mix of technical and management skills, where individuals 
frequently switched from a technical staff positions to junior management positions before 
finally transitioning to an executive position with a high tech firm. Although the transition from 
junior manager was more common than the transition from senior manager, I find that some high 
tech executives also come from a traditional management track, transitioning from junior 
management to senior management and then on to an executive post. However, many of these 
individuals worked in the technical staff position prior to moving their way up the management 
ladder. One explanation is having technical experience gives individuals valuable knowledge for 
managing technical projects and technical staff, which are often vital to high tech firms. For 
example, technical experience facilitates understanding of the complexity of technical projects, 
enabling these individuals to assign the appropriate resources and attention needed to increase 
the likelihood of success. 
The transferability of management skills across industries is also prominent among high 
tech executives. Many high tech executive positions are commonly filled by persons horizontally 
transferring industries—from another executive position in the corporate and media industries. 
Prior to their final transition to high tech, many of these corporate and media executives were 
junior managers in the high tech industry. This suggests there are potential benefits to switching 
industries, enabling managers to acquire outside knowledge which they can apply if they choose 
to return to the high tech industry. 
I also observed a clear “technical track” to executive positions, in which individuals 
transition from technical staff, to senior technical staff, to high tech executives. A closer look at 
the data reveals these tracks often lead to positions as Chief Technology Officer (CTO). Another 
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common path to high tech executive involves prior transitions from technical staff to 
entrepreneur, and then from entrepreneur to executive. This finding is consistent with the “jack-
of-all-trades” view of the entrepreneur. Running your own firm gives you experience at a diverse 
range of job responsibilities, which can give you valuable insights into managing different 
departments as an executive of a firm. 
 
Abbreviations: Arts-entrep-startup: Ar-en, Arts-executive: Ar-ex, Arts-management-senior: Ar-sm, Corporate-
entrep-startup: Cor-en, Corporate-executive: Cor-ex, Corporate-management-junior: Cor-jm, Corporate-
management-senior: Cor-sm, Corporate-other-nontech: Cor-vol, Educational-entrep-startup: Ed-en, Educational-
executive: Ed-ex, Educational-management-senior: Ed-sm, Educational-other-nontech: Ed-vol, Finance-entrep-
startup: Fi-en, Finance-executive: Fi-ex, , Finance-management-senior: Fi-sm, Finance-staff-senior: Fi-ss, High 
Tech-entrep-startup: Hi-en, High Tech-executive: Hi-ex, High Tech-management-junior: Hi-jm, High Tech-
management-senior: Hi-sm, High Tech-staff-senior-tech: Hi-sts, Media-entrep-startup: Me-en, Media-executive: 
Me-ex, Media-management-senior: Me-sm, Medical-entrep-startup: Md-en, Medical-executive: Md-ex, Medical-
management-senior: Md-sm, Medical-other-nontech: Md-vol, Medical-staff: Md-s 




Figure 4 graphs the common career transitions for senior managers in the high tech 
industry. Common job titles for senior management include senior project manager and senior 
product manager. Intra-industry transitions to senior management positions in the high tech field 
are much more common than inter-industry transitions. I find that most transitions to senior 
managers involve a transition from technical staff somewhere along the career path. One 
common career path includes transitioning from technical staff to junior management or senior 
staff before a final transition to senior management. Another path includes transitioning from 
technical staff to senior technical staff to senior management. Moreover, I find many transitions 
from senior staff, executive, and technical staff to senior management. I also find many lateral 
inter-industry transitions from senior management positions in corporate and media. However, 
many of these corporate and media senior managers had previously worked as junior managers 
in the high tech field, thus ultimately returning to their experience in the high tech industry. 
For comparison, I examined the common career paths for senior managers in other 
industries like corporate, media, education, and finance. With the exception of finance, in these 
other industries the common paths followed typical “management tracks” in which many 
individuals transition from staff to junior managers to senior managers within an industry. 
Although not as common as the high tech industry, many finance senior managers had 
previously worked in a technical staff position. Outside the high tech industry, few of the junior 
managers had technical staff experience prior to the latest transition to senior management.  
On the one hand, the prevalence of technical backgrounds for individuals in senior 
management positions is surprising because exceling in technical positions does not necessarily 
translate to skills in managing people. On the other hand, managers that have the most technical 
understanding are most capable of managing technical projects and technical talent in the firm. 
Many of the internal projects inside a high tech firm may involve a deeper understanding of an 
underlying technology or process, or more frequent interaction with technical experts—thus 
making technical knowledge important when selecting senior managers. This potential 
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explanation is supported when I looked at the specific job titles and job descriptions of senior 
managers with prior technical experience and observed that many were IT/systems managers or 
project managers over technical projects. 
 
Abbreviations: Arts-entrep-startup: Ar-en, Arts-executive: Ar-ex, Arts-management-senior: Ar-sm, Corporate-
entrep-startup: Cor-en, Corporate-executive: Cor-ex, Corporate-management-junior: Cor-jm, Corporate-
management-senior: Cor-sm, Corporate-other-nontech: Cor-vol, Educational-entrep-startup: Ed-en, Educational-
executive: Ed-ex, Educational-management-senior: Ed-sm, Educational-other-nontech: Ed-vol, Finance-entrep-
startup: Fi-en, Finance-executive: Fi-ex, , Finance-management-senior: Fi-sm, Finance-staff-senior: Fi-ss, High 
Tech-entrep-startup: Hi-en, High Tech-executive: Hi-ex, High Tech-management-junior: Hi-jm, High Tech-
management-senior: Hi-sm, High Tech-staff-senior-tech: Hi-sts, Media-entrep-startup: Me-en, Media-executive: 
Me-ex, Media-management-senior: Me-sm, Medical-entrep-startup: Md-en, Medical-executive: Md-ex, Medical-
management-senior: Md-sm, Medical-other-nontech: Md-vol, Medical-staff: Md-s 
Figure 4: Backbone Aggregate Career Transition Network of High Tech Senior Management 
Gender Differences Career Paths 
Male and Female High Tech Entrepreneurs 
I observe differences in the common career paths of male and female entrepreneurs in the 
high tech industry (see Figures 5 and 6). We find that males are more likely to make the 
transition to high tech entrepreneur from another job within the high tech industry. The most 
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common intra-industry transitions were from technical staff, executive, and staff. While the 
transitions for males were more concentrated among particular paths, the paths for female 
entrepreneurs are more evenly dispersed among many positions both within and outside the 
industry. For female entrepreneurs, the most common transitions were entrepreneurs from other 
industries, particularly corporate, media, finance, and legal. Tracing the paths back further, we 
see that many of these women were often serial entrepreneurs that launch startups in many fields. 
Overall, we observe the career paths of high tech female entrepreneurs involve broader industry 
experience. We also find that many of these women have work experience in the high tech sector 
somewhere along their career path. Among transitions from within the high tech sector, which 
were fairly common, we find that technical staff, senior technical staff, and executive positions 
were most prominent. 
One interpretation of these findings is that females have broader interest in opportunities 
in other industries, and this outside experience enables them to see entrepreneurial opportunities 
in many variety industries including high tech. This explanation is consistent with the idea of 
structural holes in networked relations, which gives brokers “vision advantages” as a result of 
spanning the different communities between industries (Burt 2004). Alternatively, women could 
be experiencing some resistance starting venturing within the high tech sector, an industry shown 
to disproportionately fund and support male entrepreneurial teams (Ruef, Aldrich and Carter 
2003). In turn, these women might earn respect by launching startups in other industries, and 




Abbreviations: Arts-entrep-startup: Ar-en, Arts-executive: Ar-ex, Arts-management-senior: Ar-sm, Corporate-
entrep-startup: Cor-en, Corporate-executive: Cor-ex, Corporate-management-junior: Cor-jm, Corporate-
management-senior: Cor-sm, Corporate-other-nontech: Cor-vol, Educational-entrep-startup: Ed-en, Educational-
executive: Ed-ex, Educational-management-senior: Ed-sm, Educational-other-nontech: Ed-vol, Finance-entrep-
startup: Fi-en, Finance-executive: Fi-ex, , Finance-management-senior: Fi-sm, Finance-staff-senior: Fi-ss, High 
Tech-entrep-startup: Hi-en, High Tech-executive: Hi-ex, High Tech-management-junior: Hi-jm, High Tech-
management-senior: Hi-sm, High Tech-staff-senior-tech: Hi-sts, Media-entrep-startup: Me-en, Media-executive: 
Me-ex, Media-management-senior: Me-sm, Medical-entrep-startup: Md-en, Medical-executive: Md-ex, Medical-
management-senior: Md-sm, Medical-other-nontech: Md-vol, Medical-staff: Md-s 







Abbreviations: Arts-entrep-startup: Ar-en, Arts-executive: Ar-ex, Arts-management-senior: Ar-sm, Corporate-
entrep-startup: Cor-en, Corporate-executive: Cor-ex, Corporate-management-junior: Cor-jm, Corporate-
management-senior: Cor-sm, Corporate-other-nontech: Cor-vol, Educational-entrep-startup: Ed-en, Educational-
executive: Ed-ex, Educational-management-senior: Ed-sm, Educational-other-nontech: Ed-vol, Finance-entrep-
startup: Fi-en, Finance-executive: Fi-ex, , Finance-management-senior: Fi-sm, Finance-staff-senior: Fi-ss, High 
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Figure 6: Backbone Aggregate Career Transition Network of Female High Tech Startup 
Entrepreneurs 
Male and Female High Tech Executives 
Figure 7 and Figure 8 illustrate the common career paths for female and male executives 
in the high tech sector. While many of the common transitions were similar among male and 
female executives, one important difference is the ranking and scale of those transitions. For 
example, relative to female executive, male executives are much more likely to come from less 
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senior roles like junior manager or staff. This is consistent is prior work on gender differences in 
executives climbing the corporate ladder. For example, in a comparative study of women and 
male executives, women reported facing stronger barriers to being promoted to executive level 
positions—relying heavily on a longer track record for advancement relative to their male 
counterparts (Lyness and Thompson 2000). One explanation offered is the women are commonly 
excluded from informal network where social bonds are formed and influential in promotion 
decisions (Williams, Muller and Kilanski 2012). The most common transition for female 
executives are media executives and high tech senior management, and for male executives they 
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Figure 8. Backbone Aggregate Career Transition Network of Male High Tech Startup Executives 
Other industries 
I draw several insights based on the observation from career transitions for entrepreneurs, 
executives, and senior managers in various industries. Regarding high tech and finance 
entrepreneurs, I observe more intra-industry transitions to entrepreneurship and a sizable portion 
of these entrepreneurs have technical or executive experience in their career paths. One 
explanation is that both high tech and finance industries require specialized and technical 
knowledge that can be barriers to inter-industries players stepping in with an innovative new-
venture idea. In all the industries except media, I observe few transitions from senior 
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management, and common transitions from executive, senior staff, and staff positions. This 
suggests that entrepreneurs tend to avoid management tracks and, given the age associations with 
staff and executive positions, often start companies early or later in their career trajectory 
(younger and older entrepreneurs) (Azoulay et al. 2017). 
Entrepreneurs transitioning from another industry tend to be serial entrepreneurs or staff. 
I observe more inter-industry transitions for entrepreneurs in medical and corporate. This makes 
sense, particularly in the medical field where medical training is very formal, standardized, and 
regulated, which are not exactly drivers of disruptive business innovations. While medical 
research certain make medical innovations, the fruits of the research are usually commercialized 
by business-focused entrepreneurs. High tech entrepreneurs seem to be the most transferable to 
other industries, appearing in the common paths for entrepreneurs in media, medical, education, 
finance, and arts. 
Turning to executives, inter-industry executive to executive transitions where highly 
common in all industries. Inter-industry transitions are particularly common among corporate 
and media executives. I also observe transitions from media executives were especially common 
among executives in corporate and the arts. Altogether, these observations suggest the executive 
skill set is highly transferable across industries and becomes more valuable (transferable) based 
on the diversity of industry experience. 
Among intra-industry career paths to executives, I observe relatively few transitions from 
junior or senior management except in corporate and finance industries where common 
transitions were from junior management and senior staff. In the high tech industry, I observe an 
interesting common path where individuals acquire a mix of both technical and junior 
management experience on the way to becoming an executive. In media, medical, and education, 
the common transitions were from staff and senior staff. 
Last, the analysis of senior management transition suggests these career paths are the 
most straightforward and intuitive. In most industries, I observe many intra-industry linear 
transitions from staff, to senior staff or junior management, to senior management. Intra-industry 
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transitions are relatively more common than inter-industry transitions in medical and finance 
industries. In addition to upward career transitions to more senior positions, several career paths 
involve transitions to positions with lower seniority. I observe several common intra-industry 
paths from executive to senior management in medical, corporate, finance, arts, and education. 
This could be people branching out from bigger firms to test their skills running a small business 
or startup—and then returning from the chaos to the stability of established enterprises. 
Moreover, lateral senior management transitions from senior management position in other 
industries is also a common path in high tech, media, corporate, finance, arts, and education. 
Among these transitions, one that stands out is the legal senior managers to high tech, media, 
corporate, and finance senior managers. One explanation could be the persistent stalled 
employment growth in the legal field, which reduces career opportunities for advancement (i.e. 
legal partnerships), thus encouraging incredibly smart legal talent to adapt skills and pursue 
advancement growing industries. 
Overall, I have discussed several insights regarding common career transitions of 
entrepreneurs, executives, and senior management. These insights can inform managers’ 
decision making process during the recruitment and hiring process for new positions, potentially 
considering non-traditional applicants from different industry and skill experiences. Conversely, 
these insights are helpful for career coaches, academic counselors, and individuals in the labor 
market (or about to enter the market) who are eager to understand the career paths that will 
improve the likelihood of reaching their career goals. Next, I test these insights by predicting an 
individual’s next job using a variety of methods. 
TESTING OBSERVATIONS: PREDICTION METHODS 
In this study, I focused extracting transition insights based on joint industry-level and 
seniority-level career transitions, which enabled us to investigate inter-industry transitions, as 
well as seniority transitions. Thus, each job was classified into one of 204 joint category-
seniority groups.  Next, I randomly sampled 50,000 careers for the training data set. I created 204 
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aggregate matrices (H) for each of the 204 job classifications (v) that were the terminal job in an 
individual’s career path. I constructed each aggregate matrix (Hv) by combining all normalized 
individual job transition graphs (G), where edges in the graph represented job transitions and the 
nodes represented the tenure in the job to which transition was made. The network graphs 
presented in the aggregated matrix (Hv) allows us to visualize and explore patterns in the career 
transitions for each of the 204 job classifications. 
I developed various methods to test prediction accuracy of the next job, for an individual, 
based on the available aggregate matrices for job classification.  Using a test sample of 20,000 
individuals, I evaluated the performance using 3 techniques 1) network backbone identification, 
2) k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN), and 3) artificial neural networks. Next, I randomly sampled 
20,000 careers for the test set among the remaining individuals. For the network “backbone” 
approach, I predicted next job outcome as identified using max(Gi*Hv). Based on 10,000 
repeated draws of the randomly sampled test data set, I found the overall accuracy of 40.45% 
using this method (see Table 4). The accuracy when considering the top 2 or top 3 values in the 
dot-product (Gi*Hv), I found the accuracy of this backbone technique to be 68.03% (see Table 
4). 
Using the prediction method based on k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) approach of 
minimizing the distance between an individual’s predicted career outcomes (as measured by the 
dot product Gi*Hv) and actual career outcome for individuals in the training set. To achieve this, 
I took the randomly sampled training set and recreated the aggregate matrices (H), as explained 
above, but this time with the last job of individuals removed from the data. I then used these 
training matrices to compute the dot products (Gi*Hv) and identified test set individuals that had 
the shortest Euclidean distance. Since the actual job outcome of the training set individuals is 
known, the prediction was the job outcome with the shortest average distance. In Table 4, I 
report the overall accuracy for the k-NN approach based on Euclidean distance. The k-NN with 
Euclidean distance performed the best, with an overall accuracy of 45.14% (see Table 4). 
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To further enhance the prediction accuracy of the model, I used a neural network 
approach by training the model using a simple learning model with single hidden layer of linear 
weights to adjust the probability of failures. Thus, the updated Ho could be written as: 
 
𝐻𝑜 =  ∑ 𝑤𝑜 . ℎ𝑖 | (𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝑜)
𝑖∈𝐼
 















Here the weights are updated as each individual in training set is added in the aggregate 
matrix. This weighting system boosted overall accuracy. I found the overall accuracy of 47.63% 
using this method (see Table 4). 
 





Network Backbone (max q-
score) 
39.55% 
k-NN (Euclidean distance)  45.14% 
Neural network weights 47.63% 
Table 4. Accuracy in Predicting Next Job 
DISCUSSION: MANAGERIAL INSIGHTS 
This is the first study, to the best of my knowledge, that uses large volume of data from a 
professional networking platform to identify career transition insights and validate their 
predictive power using career paths of 67,000 professionals. Focusing the analysis on the career 
paths of entrepreneurs, executives, and senior management in the high tech industry, I highlight 
common patterns in career trajectories. These empirically identified and validated career 
transition insights are very important, especially in a highly dynamic and technology oriented 
labor market, for strategic career planning and management. 
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I find that many high tech entrepreneurs and executives have technical or analytical 
backgrounds in their work history and one of the more common paths includes a mix of technical 
and managerial work experience prior to becoming an entrepreneur. I also find that the 
entrepreneur and executive skillsets seem highly transferable across industries. This is supported 
by the high volume of serial entrepreneurs that switch industries to start/launch another venture 
and the high frequency of executive to executive transitions between industries. As discussed in 
prior literature, it was interesting to see how positions involving technical skills fit into common 
career trajectories. I observed that high-tech entrepreneurs often make technical or mixed 
technical-management skill transitions. High-tech entrepreneurs predominantly transitioned from 
technical staff positions or from junior manager and executive roles after first working in a 
technical staff positions in high-tech industry. The jump from technical staff roles is intuitive, as 
entrepreneurship in the high tech field often involves deep understanding or expertise of a 
technology, which is facilitated by direct training and work experience with a technology as a 
programmer, engineer, or analyst.  
Moreover, entrepreneurship is a risky career transition in which most people consider the 
opportunity cost of pursuing new opportunities (Amit, Muller and Cockburn 1995, Reynolds 
1987)—particularly where the opportunity cost is higher if their current compensation is lower. 
Thus ambitious and highly skilled lower-level technical staff have lower opportunity costs and 
might be disproportionally attracted to starting their own high tech venture. This tendency is 
likely exaggerated when there is a mismatch between the individual’s skills and abilities and 
their job responsibilities. This mismatch tends to result in a poor wage (relative to skills) and in 
turn, encourages worker transition to entrepreneurship (Åstebro and Thompson 2011). 
Additionally, the transition from executive roles to entrepreneurship makes sense in light of prior 
research showing that the probability of creating a new venture is higher if the individual has 
more financial or social capital (Evans and Leighton 1989) or more transferable experience 
(Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg 1989). 
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Although not as common as in the high tech industry, technical positions were fairly 
common among the career paths of finance entrepreneurs. This makes sense given the digital 
turn in finance, which increasingly involves elite analytical and programming skills needed to 
build sophisticated learning and trading algorithms. These individuals typically entered into 
entrepreneurship earlier in their careers, transitioning from technical staff or staff positions rather 
than from senior staff or senior management positions. The high compensation for senior 
personnel and executives in the finance industry makes risky transitions to entrepreneurship less 
attractive, the longer individuals work in the industry. Technical staff positions were less 
common along the career paths of entrepreneurs in other industries outside of high tech and 
finance. 
Similar to the career paths to high tech entrepreneurs, I find that mixed skill transitions 
are common among many high tech executives and senior managers, where career paths included 
a mix of technical and management work experience. I find that many individuals reach the high-
tech executive role from junior and senior management positions after first working at technical 
staff positions within the high-tech field. One possible explanation is that high-tech executives 
need more understanding of technology to facilitate managing the technical experts and divisions 
within the firm. This idea of the mixed skill transferability is reflected in Mark Hurd’s advice to 
aspiring CEOs. 
"Don't worry about being CEO, worry about doing as many jobs as you can so that if you 
ever become CEO, when you're in the meeting with a bunch of people, you've done as 
many of their jobs as possible." - Mark Hurd, Chief Executive Officer of Oracle 
In addition, some people enter the executive roles after working in different industries, 
acquiring some diversity of experiences. This is observed for both high tech and non-high tech 
executive roles, but multiple industry experience is especially common for non-high tech fields. 
Considering the common paths to executive positions in all industries, the skillset of executives 
seems to be transferable, as evidenced by the volume and industry-diversity of inter-industry 
executive-to-executive transitions. I also observed a clear “technical track” to executive 
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positions, in which individuals transition from technical staff, to senior technical staff, to high 
tech executives. A closer look at the data reveals these tracks often lead to positions as Chief 
Technology Officer (CTO). 
While the career paths to executive roles included large portion of inter-industry 
transitions, most paths to senior management include predominately intra-industry transitions. In 
high tech, I find some lateral inter-industry transitions from senior management positions in 
corporate and media, but many of these corporate and media senior managers had previously 
worked as junior managers in the high tech field and thus are returning high tech industry. 
Moreover, the high tech and finance industries are distinct from other industries in the number of 
individuals who work in technical staff positions along their career paths to senior management. 
One explanation is that technical experience is important to effectively managing technical 
projects, which I observe in the specific job titles and job descriptions of individuals following 
this mixed skill career path. For example, technical understanding can help project managers 
assess the difficulty of particular tasks and differentiate the abilities of technical employees 
working on a project, which is helpful in creating timelines and assigning teams. 
Based the analysis, it is reasonable to suggest that the interaction of opportunity 
structures and skill portability are key explanatory factors for how/when (under what conditions) 
people transfer from one industry to another. As discussed above, the strong job growth in 
industries like high tech, education, and health services in the last few decades provided better 
opportunities for career advancement and better wages relative to stagnating industries. In 
addition to the relative and aggregate employment numbers in a given industry, structural 
changes in industries will impact individual career transitions via the creation and destruction of 
career opportunities. To take an obvious example, we have observed the fractionalization of 
particular industries, most notably media. While the media industry used to be more centralized, 
with distinguished firms/outlets entrusted with professional sourced news and information (e.g. 
NYT, Washington Post), the rise of social media has enabled more decentralized production of 
content to smaller target audiences. Social media platforms enable unprecedented levels of 
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targeting by ever-increasingly specific personality/identity/taste characteristics. This 
fractionalization has enabled more opportunities for entrepreneurs launching media startups, 
which can chip away at the broader audience once commanded by larger media outlets. It also 
creates more capacity to find a niche audience and produce content that speaks to specific groups 
(groups based on ideology, politics, morality, personality etc.). 
Career opportunities yielded by the relative growth of particular industries provides an 
insufficient explanation, because workers must have transferable skills to be able to capitalize on 
those opportunities. In the high tech industry, the findings suggest that technical skills and a mix 
of technical and management skills facilitate intra-industry, or inter-industry, transitions to 
entrepreneurship, executives, and senior managers. The results suggest that entrepreneurial and 
executive-level experience are more transferable between industries, while entry and staff-level 
skills are less transferable across industries. Thus, individuals in staff roles are more likely to 
make intra-industry transitions to more senior-level roles. 
I find that individuals with certain transferable skills—notably technical, management, 
mixed, and boundary-spanning experience—are more likely to be in position to capitalize on job 
opportunities from differential growth across industries. Specifically, high-tech entrepreneurs 
tend to be “jacks of all trades” with more general-purpose skills that can be more readily 
transferred to more specific domains in other industries with high opportunity potential. Thus, 
people who develop skills in high-tech are more likely to make inter-industry transitions based 
on opportunity potential. This could explain trends such as tech entrepreneurs going into online, 
digital training programs (educational) and entertainment programs—essentially making a high-
tech company using digital technologies to educate/entertain people. In short, the findings 
suggest that when an individual has portable skills and high opportunities in different industries, 
this individual is more likely to transition to different industry. Overall, I have discussed several 
insights regarding common career transitions of entrepreneurs, executives, and senior 
management. These insights can better inform managers during their decision making process, 
while in the recruitment and hiring process for new positions. For example, manager might be 
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more willing to consider candidates transitioning from seemingly unrelated industries, or 
candidates with mixed skillsets that do not intuitively match a position’s requirements. 
Conversely, these insights are helpful for career coaches, academic counselors, and individuals 
in the labor market (or about to enter the market) who are eager to understand the career paths 
that will improve the likelihood of reaching their career goals. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper analyzes 67,000 career profiles from a popular social networking platform. I 
build career trajectories (as network graphs) that provide insights on career paths of 
entrepreneurs, executives, and senior managers. In these career trajectory graphs, each node is a 
job consisting of an industry-level and seniority-level classification. Focusing on high-tech 
industry, I find that individuals with certain transferable skills — notably technical, management, 
mixed, and boundary-spanning experience — are more likely to be in position to capitalize on 
job opportunities across industries. Furthermore, I test these insights by developing and refining 
a supervised learning model for predicting individual career transitions of 10,000 individuals and 
achieve 48% accuracy for 204 job choices. Managerially, these insights can help in recruitment, 
career planning, job search and more. 
While the analysis provided many insights useful for managers and labor market 
scholarship, there are some limitations. The prediction accuracy in testing the insights from the 
network approach to career trajectories gives us some confidence in the findings, but the 
prediction accuracy could be improved by considering multilayer neural networks or sequential 
pattern mining. Moreover, devising a procedure for correctly classifying 427,054 jobs into 
meaningful categories is a non-trivial task, thus there might be some errors in the industry 
classification. Those errors would propagate in the prediction process and likely be responsible 
for some reduction in the prediction rate. One way to evaluate and potentially improve the 




Chapter 2: Social Networks, Funding, and Regional Advantages in 
Technology Entrepreneurship 
Economic factors, funding opportunities and social networks have influenced 
entrepreneurs’ choice of their startup location. With increased penetration of digital technologies 
in startups, the traditional need for proximity to specific locations or large funding for 
infrastructure development have diminished. Digital entrepreneurs now pursue locations that 
provide more opportunities for funding and greater social support, and enable lower startup 
costs. In this paper, I use economic indicators made publicly available by the U.S. government, 
investment information from CrunchBase, and professional histories and network data from 
LinkedIn, to study regional and personal factors that influence digital entrepreneurs’ location 
choice. These digital entrepreneurs have a choice to establish a startup in their current location or 
move to a different location. When relocating, entrepreneurs decide to create a startup 
immediately or delay it by a short duration (possibly to be more embedded in local environment). 
Analysis of 1,424 entrepreneurs, suggests that funding rounds per year play a significant and 
positive role in influencing startup creation and local social network proportion and tenure in 
location provide a stickiness to decision making and negatively influence entrepreneurs' 
decisions to relocate. 
INTRODUCTION 
Digital technologies have disrupted many industries by impacting the entire value chain, 
business models, and strategies of organizations (Bharadwaj et al. 2013, Rai and Tang 2014). 
However, these technologies have especially impacted digital entrepreneurship by reducing 
startup costs and giving entrepreneurs additional degree of freedom in their location choices for 
new ventures. Choice of location is especially important for digital entrepreneurs because 
attractive locations are likely to become more expensive as the demand for that location 
increases. This has been true for Silicon Valley that has gained a prominent position for digital 
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entrepreneurship (Kotkin and Schill 2015) but is now losing the charm because of increasing 
costs of real-estate and talent.  
Schumpeter (1942) places the entrepreneur at the center of the economic and 
technological growth. The literature shows that entrepreneurship is a key factor in moving 
technology from the laboratory to the market and the link between a country’s economic 
prosperity and the creation of an economic future (Ács and Audretsch 2003, Glaeser, Rosenthal 
and Strange 2010). With the changing nature and requirements of startups in the current 
economy, this research seeks to understand the factors that influence the movement of digital 
entrepreneurs to high-tech regions. More specifically, I examine the factors that influence 
entrepreneurs’ location choices to either move to a high-tech hub, remain in their current 
location, or move to a new location and work for a short while before creating a startup. 
In the U.S., technology entrepreneurship is predominantly linked to a few technology 
clusters with regional advantage. A key factor in developing regional advantage and prosperity 
associated with technology hubs is retaining and attracting high-skill talent. Although the San 
Francisco Bay area is still the dominant region among technology clusters, Austin (TX) has long 
been one of the top U.S. cities for high tech growth, presiding over the strongest expansion in 
tech sector employment and among the highest growth rates in STEM employment (Kotkin and 
Schill 2015). Moreover, Austin also ranks highest on the Kauffman Foundation’s Startup 
Activity Index, derived from number of new entrepreneurs, startup density, and percent of 
entrepreneurs starting companies because of perceived market opportunities (Morelix et al. 
2015). More recently, Kauffman’s Index points to cities like Los Angeles and Miami showing 
robust growth in startups and technology employment. However, despite widespread interest in 
entrepreneurship and the importance of entrepreneurs to the local and regional economy (Shane 
and Ulrich 2004), we have a relatively limited understanding of factors that influence 
entrepreneurs’ decision to move to a new location to create a startup, which contributes to the 
heterogeneous economic and technological growth among major metropolitan areas. 
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This study adds to the literature that examines the role of both aggregated metropolitan 
economic indicators and individual-level factors that influence individual (re)location decisions 
(Dahl and Sorenson 2009, Figueiredo, Guimaraes and Woodward 2002). This paper analyzes an 
original and novel dataset of entrepreneur career paths with direct observation of personal 
connections to empirically model the location and entrepreneurial choice of individuals. The 
following section discusses the related background literature used to develop a formalized theory 
for the location choice of entrepreneurs. 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
Technology Clusters 
A large body of scholarship explores the foundations of regional advantage and the 
transformation of regions through technology entrepreneurship and explains why some regions 
have prospered and others have not (Gibson and Butler 2013, Saxenian 1994, Saxenian 1999, 
Venkataraman 2004). Much of the extant literature is concerned with ecosystems of 
agglomeration including spin-offs and the regional clustering of firms (Fetters et al. 2010, 
Marshall 1920, Moore 1993, Porter 1990, Saxenian 1994, Schumpeter and Opie 1934). As noted 
by Engel (2015), the literature on clustering explains how areas specializing in an industry gain 
competitive advantages as a result of economies of scale, reduction of transaction costs, and 
capturing spillover demand (Krugman and Obstfeld 1997). However, this account falls short in 
explaining how highly innovative clusters support the continuous emergence of technology 
startups, many of which are not similar to the original business concentration of the cluster. 
Focusing on entrepreneurs’ location choice can help develop a richer understanding of what 
retains and attracts entrepreneurs launching these new startups that fuel high-tech clusters. 
Conceptualized by Saxenian (1994), innovation-centered business clusters are geographic 
concentrations of related companies focused on a scientific or technological knowledge base. 
Firms in the cluster share common physical and human capital needs and often conduct business 
with each other. The concept of an innovation-centered business cluster added a stronger 
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explanatory framework to the constant emergence of new firms in high tech clusters than the 
original cluster literature. Saxenian juxtaposed two high-tech clusters, Silicon Valley and Route 
128 in Boston and showed how Silicon Valley emerged as the model for an innovation-centered 
business cluster. Research on Silicon Valley as a model for high-tech regions is very robust. It 
has examined levels of growth, productivity and employment (Feldman 2000, Steiner 1998) 
financing of new ventures (Hellmann 2000, Wonglimpiyarat 2006), industrial clustering (Kenney 
and Von Burg 1999), and cloning Silicon Valley (Engstrom 1987, Rosenberg 2002). Literature 
on Austin, Texas (Fetters et al. 2010, Gibson and Butler 2013, Smilor, Gibson and Kozmetsky 
1989) and Route 128 in Boston (Dorfman 1983) has also contributed to understanding 
innovation-centered business clusters, specifically offering the “technopolis wheel” as a 
framework for operationalizing key economic indicators powering regional hubs for technology 
innovation (see Figure 9) (Smilor, Gibson and Kozmetsky 1989). 
 
 
Figure 9: Measuring components of the technopolis wheel 
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The “technopolis wheel” (see Figure 9) shows the interaction of seven segments in the 
institutional make-up of innovation-centered business clusters. These segments include the 
research university, established technology companies, emerging technology companies, state 
and local governments, federal government and different support groups (Smilor, Gibson and 
Kozmetsky 1989). Past literature has established the importance of these institutional alliances 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1997, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000, Powers 2004). This offers a 
clear framework for conceptualizing the economic and institutional factors influencing startup 
development and thus impacting entrepreneurs’ decisions. One can overlay several indicators on 
this framework to empirically measure the factors that influence entrepreneurship decisions 
regarding startup location, including employment and growth, investment availability, 
innovation, and the personal social network of the entrepreneur. 
Social Networks and Embeddedness 
In addition to the advantages of technology clusters and location-specific factors in the 
technopolis framework, individuals also value social connections and we sometimes 
underestimate the degree of influence social networks have on our career choices (Dahl and 
Sorenson 2010). We expect that social structures and networks influence an individual’s 
migrating pattern (Massey 1990). It has been shown that an individual's decision to move is 
influenced by localized concentration of their social network ties (Dahl and Sorenson 2010, Dahl 
and Sorenson 2012, White and Green 2010). Research has also shown that the size and strength 
of one’s local social network negatively impacts the individual’s propensity to move to a new 
location (Dahl and Sorenson 2010, Sjaastad 1962), even after controlling for wage and cost of 
living differentials between metropolitan areas (Michaelides 2011). Prior work also demonstrates 
that stronger interpersonal ties play a significant role in job search by unemployed individuals 
(Garg and Telang 2011) and shape information flow and knowledge diffusion among innovators 
(Ganco 2013, Singh 2005). 
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While many high performance individuals are motivated by and attracted to economic 
opportunity (Agarwal et al. 2004, Campbell et al. 2012), prior research indicates entrepreneurs 
have a propensity to start a company in the same locale where they previously worked because 
this choice enables them to use their existing local networks (Rogers 1995, Romanelli and 
Feldman 2004, Sorenson 2003). The literature shows that entrepreneurs tend to start their 
businesses in locations in which they have strong social ties or “deep roots”, typically places 
where they have family and friends, yielding rich endowments of location embedded social 
capital (Dahl and Sorenson 2009, Dahl and Sorenson 2012, Katona and Morgan 1952, 
Michelacci and Silva 2007, Mueller and Morgan 1962). Moreover, with increasing penetration of 
online social networks, entrepreneurs can now more easily identify and connect with individuals 
that could provide support (business, social, or financial) to grow their startup. With the 
emergence of these online social networks and increased diffusion of information (Aral and 
Walker 2012, Garg, Smith and Telang 2011, Singh and Phelps 2013, Tambe and Hitt 2013), it is 
reasonable to expect that these multiple, online social connections will have an increased 
importance on decision-making and knowledge creation (Singh, Tan and Mookerjee 2011).  
This study contributes to the literature on technology entrepreneurship by investigating 
the metropolitan and individual-level social network factors that influence how entrepreneurs 
select a location to start a company. Understanding why certain locations are better able to retain 
and attract digital entrepreneurs is a key component to explaining regional variation in 
entrepreneurial activity. Next, I formalize a theory for entrepreneurs’ location choice and present 
testable hypotheses. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Starting a new venture is risky due to the high level of uncertainty around the outcome 
(success). According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), over 500,000 startups are 
created every month in United States1 and only 25% of those startups survive over time2. 





Despite the uncertainty, entrepreneurs accept the risk and incur lost wages and other costs 
associated with running a startup because they expect a lucrative exit or significant profits 
(Peters 2009). At any given time-period an entrepreneur’s period utility is driven by the 
difference in the net profit made by the new venture and the lost wages. During the early time 
periods, most startups generate little to no revenue and most entrepreneurs restrict their personal 
salaries below the market rate. Therefore, at the beginning, an entrepreneur is likely to have 
negative period utility because the lost wages and low net profits generated by the startup. As a 
result, an entrepreneur is likely to pursue funding opportunities or minimize costs to maximize 
the utility received from starting a company in location j at time t. Thus, startup location that 
lower the costs and maximize the probability of funding will then contribute to the selection of 
that location for a startup. 
In addition, the growth and ubiquity of digital technologies has reduced the startup costs 
for entrepreneurs. Since technology startups usually have much lower infrastructure needs and 
remotely deployed resources (e.g., cloud-based computing) (Ross and Blumenstein 2015), 
entrepreneurs conceivably have more degrees of freedom in their location choice for new 
ventures (Heger, Veith and Rinawi 2011). Thus, a digital entrepreneur’s location choice is driven 
by factors that influence the startup’s ability to generating growth signals, acquire key resources, 
and reduce costs. 
Growth signals for startups could include capital investment by external entities (e.g., VC 
firms, angel investors, etc.), patents, media coverage (Greenwood and Gopal Forthcoming), 
growth of customer base, and interpersonal or electronic word-of-mouth diffusion by their 
network (friends, employees, stakeholders, or consumers) (Aggarwal and Singh 2013, Aggarwal 
et al. 2012a, Aggarwal et al. 2012b, Greenwood and Gopal 2015, Susarla, Oh and Tan 2016). An 
entrepreneur’s social network and local embeddedness are key resources that help a startup’s 
development. Social connections can help reduce search costs as entrepreneurs filter information 
to access and secure vital resources (e.g., tacit technology knowledge, talent pools, supply and 
distribution chains, customers) (Ruef, Aldrich and Carter 2003, Sorenson and Waguespack 
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2006). Entrepreneurs acquire these local connections over time as they become more embedded 
in a location, thus creating stickiness for movement by imposing high transition costs to growing 
a venture in a new location where the entrepreneur has fewer connections and is less embedded.  
Since costs vary for each metropolitan region, movement across regions is not costless, 
and location characteristics will adjust the period utility for each entrepreneur differently, I 
define three classes of entrepreneurs 1) entrepreneurs who are aware of other locations but 
decide to create a startup in their existing location , 2) entrepreneurs that have higher immediate 
utility to create a startup in new location, and 3) entrepreneurs that identify a new location for 
their startup but decide to embed themselves in that location before creating the new venture. 
Thus, I classify these three group of entrepreneurs (see Figure 10 below) as 1) entrepreneurs that 
don’t move and create a startup, 2) entrepreneurs that move and create a startup immediately, 
and 3) entrepreneurs that move and create a startup after a short delay (less than one year). 
 
 




For an entrepreneur’s new venture, profit in a time period t is likely to be dependent on 
the profits or investments received in the previous time period because these market signals are 
likely to enhance the success of these startups (Conti, Thursby and Rothaermel 2010). For 
technology startups, capital investment from a prominent VC or Angel group is a valuable signal 
of the quality of a startup (Aggarwal, Kryscynski and Singh 2015). This “signaling function” of 
investment firms is important to startups’ survival because working with a new venture is risky 
and many service providers (e.g., lawyers, recruiters, consultants) refuse to collaborate with a 
startup without this positive signal (Ferrary and Granovetter 2009). Moreover, prior research 
suggests that increased supply of venture capital in a location positively influences the number of 
startups launched (Samila and Sorenson 2011). Complementing this, anecdotal evidence from 
conversations with entrepreneurs suggests that digital entrepreneurs are largely driven by 
available funding opportunities in creating a startup. Thus, I expect that number of funding 
opportunities in a location are likely to influence the decision of an entrepreneur to select that 
location for creating technology startup. 
Hypothesis 1a: Number of funding rounds in a location would influence potential 
entrepreneurs in creating a startup in that location and 
Hypothesis 1b: Number of funding rounds in a location would attract potential 
entrepreneurs from different locations to create a startup in that location 
In addition to funding, another important factor assumed to be important for a startup is 
innovation. Prior research on metropolitan areas have reported an association between higher 
patent rates and higher levels of innovation and productivity gains (Rothwell et al. 2013). 
Literature has also shown the importance of patents in creating geographically concentrated spin-
off clusters (Butler and Gibson 2011). Thus, metropolitan areas with companies and research 
laboratories yielding more patents may potentially attract entrepreneurial talent with ambitions to 
leverage or license newly patented technologies in the future. New ventures based on 
sophisticated technology tend to launch near existing organization that developed the technology 
because effective use of the technology often requires active communication (Van den Bulte and 
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Moenaert 1998) and tacit knowledge that remains geographically concentrated and transferred 
through close social ties (Sorenson and Audia 2000). Furthermore, for technology startups, 
patents filed by a startup are also shown to provide a signal to investors, which is one of the 
primary motivations digital entrepreneurs give for seeking patent protection (Conti, Thursby and 
Rothaermel 2010, Sichelman 2015). As a result, I hypothesize that the number of patents in a 
region are likely to signal innovation culture of that region and attract potential entrepreneurs in 
selecting that location for their startup. 
Hypothesis 2a: Number of patents in a location would influence potential entrepreneurs 
in creating a startup in that location and 
Hypothesis 2b: Number of patents in a location would attract potential entrepreneurs 
from different locations to create a startup in that location 
Digital entrepreneurs are likely to select locations for their startup where the local 
economic and labor market conditions are attractive for the growth. As noted earlier, I 
operationalize concepts from the technopolis wheel that measure key factors that may attract or 
retain entrepreneurial talent including metropolitan-level factors like the unemployment rate and 
local workforce (total employment). The association between unemployment and 
entrepreneurship is mixed in the literature and there is no concrete explanation for the 
relationship beyond underlying rigidities in the economy (Parker, 2009). When considering 
digital entrepreneurship, I expect that local talent becomes less important because the technology 
works could be distributed remotely across the globe. Thus, when a location has a larger 
workforce employed in different organization it is likely to discourage entrepreneurship because 
the local culture is favorable to employees. But, more intuitively, when a location has a larger 
unemployed labor it is likely to discourage entrepreneurship because the local community may 
not provide enough resources to develop and grow the startup. Still, the local economic 
conditions and unemployment rate could also influence the decisions of entrepreneurs to select a 
specific location. A location with thriving labor market may provide potentially attractive 
resources and customer base while a location with higher unemployment may discourage 
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innovation. While not focal in the analysis, I include employment and unemployment rate as 
control variables in the model.  
An entrepreneur’s social network in a location is also an important factor in the 
development of their new venture. Working professionals with ambitions of launching their own 
venture become locally embedded over time as they acquire and maintain social and professional 
ties. This creates a stickiness to their current location because the entrepreneur would face 
friction in launching a startup in a new location where they are not locally embedded. Beyond 
the social and emotional utility generated by their existing connections, these local ties and 
knowledge is critical to reducing search costs for key resources for the new venture.  
Launching a startup requires close relationships with mutual trust (Feldman 2000, Hite 
and Hesterly 2001, Porter 1998) between the entrepreneur and investors, boards of directors, 
financial and legal service providers, industry leaders (Krabel and Mueller 2009), and other 
entrepreneurs starting new ventures (Hsu 2006). These relationships are difficult to create 
quickly and are facilitated by consistent face-to-face interaction over time—thus relocating is 
costly in terms of developing new relationships in a foreign context (Figueiredo, Guimaraes and 
Woodward 2002). Further, research indicates that co-located social connections increase the 
odds of securing early funding from friends and family (Bygrave et al. 2003). Local social ties 
also influence funding opportunities from venture capitalists (Shane and Stuart 2002, Stuart and 
Sorenson 2003), in part because social ties offer a mechanism for investors to acquire 
information about entrepreneurs seeking to start new ventures and a means for entrepreneurs to 
establish a reputation (Amit, Glosten and Muller 1990, Shane and Cable 2002). Research has 
also shown that more socially embedded entrepreneurs have an easier time recruiting talent 
because prior relationships demonstrate reliability and increase employees’ willingness to work 
for the entrepreneur (Ruef, Aldrich and Carter 2003, Sorenson and Waguespack 2006). Thus, I 
expect entrepreneurs to start companies in locations with a higher proportion of their social 
network ties, or tie-proportion. 
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Hypothesis 3a: Social stickiness: entrepreneurs’ social network proportion in a location 
would encourage potential entrepreneurs in creating a startup in that location and 
Hypothesis 3b: Social stickiness: entrepreneurs’ social network proportion in a location 
would discourage potential entrepreneurs in creating a startup in a different location 
Similarly, an entrepreneur’s tenure in a location would then be an important factor 
influencing the location choice for the new venture, creating a stickiness for movement to a new 
location. Prior research also shows a strong relationship between time in a community and social 
attachment to a community (Dahl and Sorenson 2009). On average, the more time an 
entrepreneur spends in a place, the more socially attached they become to that community 
because they develop trust in community members and a personal connection to the history of a 
place (Hite 2005). Social attachment to place can also be an emotional affinity derived from 
social preferences to be near friends/family in a secure and enjoyable community (Dahl and 
Sorenson 2009). This is supported by research showing entrepreneurs tend to start companies in 
close proximity to location of birth (Michelacci and Silva 2007), and location of prior 
employment (Buenstorf and Klepper 2009, Figueiredo, Guimaraes and Woodward 2002, 
Parwada 2008). Thus, I expect the likelihood that an entrepreneur starts a company in a location 
increases in proportion to the time spent in that location. 
Hypothesis 4a: Local stickiness: entrepreneurs’ tenure in a location would encourage 
potential entrepreneurs in creating a startup in that location and 
Hypothesis 4b: Local stickiness: entrepreneurs’ tenure in a location would discourage 
potential entrepreneurs in creating a startup in a different location.  





Summary of Hypotheses 
 Path 1 Path 2 Path 3 
Social Stickiness +ve (current location) +ve (current location) 
-ve (past location) 
Local Stickiness +ve (current location) +ve (current location) 
-ve (past location) 
Funding +ve (funding rounds) 
Innovation +ve 
 
Table 5: Summary of Hypotheses 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
To empirically validate the above hypotheses, I build on the prior theory in 
entrepreneurship and economics (Todaro 1969, Westlund and Bolton 2003, Woodward, 
Figueiredo and Guimaraes 2006) to propose that individual level utility received from 
entrepreneurship activity is: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = −𝑐𝑖𝑗 − 𝑤𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑗 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗   (1) 
Here c is the combination of cost incurred by entrepreneur i in a location j and w is 
monetary loss of income. X are the observable entrepreneur characteristics – including social 
network densities in location j, Z are the location specific time-varying characteristics that are 
represented in Technopolis – including the investments available in the region, and ε is the 
unobserved iid stochastic error assumed to have extreme value type I distribution. Prior research 
suggests that regional factors such as population, income and wealth, and employment within a 
region influence and individual’s intent to become an entrepreneur (Kibler 2013). These 
metropolitan-level economic variables are included (Z) in the model. 
Here the entrepreneur faces two decision choices 1) to continue working or start a new 
company or 2) to stay in existing location or move to a new location. I currently estimate and 
present the results for the conditional choice mixed model (Boskin 1974) and leave the possible 
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nested nature of such decisions for future extension of this work. In addition, I add a location 
fixed effect to control for location specific, time-invariant unobservables such as local 
government infrastructure or universities. Thus, I estimate the following mixed logistic 
regression model: 
𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑍𝑗𝑡−1|𝑓, 𝑗) = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗   (2) 
Where D is the observed binary decision of entrepreneur i to start a company in location j 
at time t that is a function of observable user (X) and location (Z) characteristics, which is 
conditional on user moving to a different location. Thus, I estimate three separate models with 
three different binary outcomes: 1) entrepreneur decides to start a company (vs. continue 
working) in the current location, 2) entrepreneur decides to move to a different location and 
immediately starts a company, and 3) entrepreneur decides to move to a different location (as 
employee) and start a company after a one-year delay (vs. continuing to work as employee 
beyond that time).3 
DATA AND VARIABLE SPECIFICATION 
To learn more about the aggregated metropolitan-level and individual social network 
factors underlying the geographic mobility of entrepreneurs, I focus on the within-country 
(United States) migration of entrepreneurs. I constructed a database of entrepreneurs’ 
employment histories using individual LinkedIn profiles and startup investment data from 
CrunchBase—a self-reported database for startup funding and activity and the MoneyTree™ 
Report from PricewaterhouseCoopers and the National Venture Capital Association based on 
data provided by Thomson Reuters. The CrunchBase and PwC databases included company 
names of 41,615 startups that received at least one infusion of venture or angel capital between 
1995 and 2014-Q1 (data collected 2014-Q3).  
                                                 
3 The logit model is well-justified here because I model and interpret each outcome separately (independently). 
Individuals can choose to launch a startup multiple times in different time periods, and indeed some of the 
entrepreneurs in the database are serial entrepreneurs over their careers. Whether or not to launch a venture is a 
repeated, independent choice that individuals make at each job transition. Furthermore, I selected the logit model 
rather than the multinomial logit model (another valid option) because the logit model offers a more intelligible 
interpretation of the estimates. 
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I randomly sampled 2,000 startups from this investment database. Using LinkedIn public 
profiles, I identified the startup founder/co-founder of these startups. In cases of multiple co-
founders, I only selected one co-founder so the individual entrepreneur database included one 
entrepreneur per startup. Of these 2000 randomly selected startups, I acquired the complete 
LinkedIn profile data for 1,424 entrepreneurs (352 of which founded 2 or more startups) while 
remaining 576 had incomplete profiles, mostly missing location data. These complete profile 
pages contained self-reported job histories and education including titles, dates, locations, as well 
as the entrepreneurs’ skill endorsements. The analysis focuses on these 1,424 entrepreneurs.  
I also acquired social network data from LinkedIn but since much of the online social 
networks are comprised of weak ties (De Meo et al. 2014), I used endorsement ties because they 
can provide a reasonable proxy for stronger ties in one’s social network. A skill endorsement tie 
is established on LinkedIn when a member of an entrepreneur’s first-degree network endorses 
him/her for a particular work-related skill or attribute (e.g., leadership, creativity, work ethic). 
These skill endorsements are generated voluntarily at any time by individuals in one’s network. 
These endorsements are not solicited by the receiver and endorsements can be removed by either 
the giver or receiver at any time. The fact that an entrepreneur has accepted an endorsement, at 
the least, suggests some reasonable degree of familiarity with the endorser and willingness to be 
publicly associated with their contact on their home profile page. Although the specific 
motivation of each individual endorsement is well outside the scope of this analysis, in general it 
is reasonable to suggest endorsers aim to strengthen their connection perhaps hoping to receive 
reciprocal endorsements or to facilitate contact at a later date. Therefore, endorsement ties are 
expected to be stronger ties of social networks than generic connections. To further mitigate the 
risk of over- or under-estimating the role of local social networks I consider tie-proportion in a 
location for empirical analysis. 
Next, I collected location-specific data for 68 large metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). 
I geocoded (latitude/longitude coordinates) the current and past locations listed on LinkedIn 
profiles of the entrepreneurs and skill endorsement connections. I then collapsed all geocoded 
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locations within 100 miles of a MSAs to the nearest MSA. I collected economic variables for the 
68 MSAs using the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) metropolitan-level databases. I used 
investment data from CrunchBase, a comprehensive self-reported database for startup funding 
and activity. For patent data at the metropolitan level, I used the Strumsky Patent Database 
(Strumsky 2014) that contains annual counts for patents granted by the US Patent and Trademark 
office between 1975 and 2013 (Bearman 1997). 
Variable specifications 
Individual-Level variables 
In the model, graduate education is a binary indicator variable that has a value of one if 
the entrepreneur has a graduate degree. Tie-proportion measures the percentage of endorsement 
ties residing in a location. For each entrepreneur, this measure is simply the fraction of the 
number of endorsement ties in a given location divided by the total number of endorsement ties. 
I created a variable for an entrepreneur’s “stickiness” to a location; I measure current location 
stickiness as the cumulative work experience in the current location. For entrepreneurs that 
change locations from their previous job and start a company (either immediately or after a 
short-term job), I measure previous location stickiness as the cumulative work experience in 
previous location. 
MSA-level variables 
Average funding averages the investment-funding amount per year for the 68 
metropolitan areas. Total funding rounds count the number of funding rounds per year in each 
metropolitan area. Patents equal the total number of patents per year in a given metropolitan 
area.  
To measure the economic strength of MSAs, I used several indicators of metro-
performance. Unemployment rate is the percentage of people unemployed per year by 
metropolitan area. Employment is the number of employed persons in a metropolitan area. I also 
created two binary indicator variables to control for time. Recession has a value of 1 if an 
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entrepreneur's job started in the U.S. recession between 2007-2009. Post-recession has a value 1 
if an entrepreneur's’ job started after the latest recession (2010-2014). Coding the variables in 
this way makes jobs started in the pre-recession period as the baseline. Table 6 presents 
descriptive statistics for the variables specified in the models. 
 
Descriptive statistics (N = 7241) 
   
Variables mean sd 
Individual-level   
Tie-Proportion 0.36 0.279 
Cumulative Tenure at 






Metro-level   
Avg. Funding Per Year 




















Observations 7243  
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics 
The 1,424 entrepreneurs in the dataset reported 7,241 jobs in their career, and 2,077 of 
those jobs were founder/co-founder jobs launching a startup4. Among these entrepreneurs, 55 
percent did not move and founded a startup in their existing MSA, 31 percent moved and 
immediately founded a startup, and 15 percent moved and worked a short-term job before 
starting a company.  
                                                 
4 The number of founding jobs is larger than the number of entrepreneurs because 352 entrepreneurs founded 2 or 
more startups.  
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Among entrepreneurs who migrated and started a company within the first year of 
moving to the new location, I find entrepreneur migration highly concentrated in a few 
metropolitan areas. As shown in Figure 11, 63 percent of relocating entrepreneurs moved to one 
of five metropolitan areas, the San Francisco Bay area, Austin, New York City, Los Angeles, and 
Boston. These top destinations for launching startups are consistent with past literature on 
technology innovation clusters. Not surprisingly, the San Francisco Bay area that includes 
Silicon Valley/San Jose was the top destination, attracting over a quarter (26 percent) of moving 
entrepreneurs. All of these metropolitan areas are also consistently reported in traditional media 
outlets as the top locations for entrepreneurs launching startups (Morelix et al. 2015). 
Most of these top locations also have the most funding rounds for startups (see Figure 
12). The San Francisco Bay area had 28 percent of all recorded funding rounds and far more 
rounds (15,407) than the rest of the locations, with New York City having the next highest 
(6,258) funding rounds. However, Austin, which attracted the second most entrepreneurs, was 
10th and 13th respectively in terms of total funding rounds and total funding amount raised by 





Figure 11: Target locations for entrepreneurs 
 





Figure 13: Distribution of entrepreneurs’ endorsement ties 
Looking at social network factors, the distribution of entrepreneurs’ endorsement ties is 
shown in Figure 13. The median number of ties for entrepreneurs is 89 and the tie distribution is 
skewed right with few entrepreneurs having more than 130 social ties. Figure 14 shows top 15 
pairwise location transitions among entrepreneurs. Consistent with popular press reporting on the 
top entrepreneurial hubs, the larger San Francisco Bay Area (Silicon Valley), Austin, and New 




Figure 14: Top 15 Pairwise Location Transitions  
RESULTS 
Table 7 presents the estimated beta coefficients of logistic regressions. I report the odds 
ratios (exponentiated coefficients) to facilitate interpretation. The dependent variable in columns 
1 and 2 is a binary indicator of whether or not the entrepreneur started a company in the same 
location. Both columns 1 and 2 are specified with random effects for entrepreneurs.5 In columns 
2, I introduce a metropolitan area fixed effect and remove the economic indicators.6 In columns 3 
and 4, the dependent variable is whether or not the entrepreneur moved to a different location 
and immediately started a company. The dependent variable for columns 5 and 6 is whether or 
not the entrepreneur moved to different location and started a company after a short delay 
(worked as an employee for a duration of one year or less before starting a company). The model 
specification is the same across all the models, except for the location stickiness variable. When 
                                                 
5 I also specified the models with an individual fixed effect to account for individual-specific unobservables that 
might be correlated with the dependent variable, but the estimates did not significantly change. 
6 It is plausible that there might be other omitted metro-level variables correlated with the dependent variable, such 
as the number of research institutes, universities, or startups in a metropolitan area. The location fixed effect controls 
for these unobservables, thus reducing omitted variable bias. 
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entrepreneurs change locations, the stickiness variable measures the cumulative work experience 
in the previous location (prior to the startup location). For columns 3 and 4, this is the location of 
the previous job. For columns 5 and 6, this is the location of the job before the short-term job 
(because the short-term job is in the same location as the startup). In columns 1 and 2, the 
entrepreneur is not changing locations to launch the startup, so the stickiness measure is the 
cumulative work experience in the current location where the startup is launched (not including 
the duration of the founder job).  
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Logistic regression estimates for entrepreneur startups in same/different locations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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Observations 5096 6955 5096 6929 5096 6572 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table 7: Logistic regression estimates for entrepreneur startups in same/different locations 
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The estimates for tie-proportion (in Table 7, columns 1 and 2) are positive and significant 
for entrepreneurs who start a company in their current location. This indicates that entrepreneurs 
are more likely to start a company in their present location if their tie-proportion in that location 
is high, suggesting that ties play an important role in supporting entrepreneurs thus supporting 
hypothesis H3a. Interpreting column 2 in Table 7, for a 0.1 increase in the tie-proportion in a 
location, ceteris paribus, the odds of an entrepreneur starting a company increase by a factor of 
1.11 and this estimate is statistically significant (p<0.001).  
The tie-proportion estimates are also significant for entrepreneurs changing locations and 
starting companies. If an entrepreneur’s tie-proportion in a current metropolitan area is higher, 
the entrepreneur is less likely to move to a different location and start a company immediately 
thus supporting hypothesis H3b. If an entrepreneur’s tie-proportion in a new metropolitan area is 
higher, I observe that entrepreneurs are more likely to start a company in the new location after a 
short duration working as employee thus supporting hypothesis H3a. Interpreting column 4 in 
Table 7, for a 0.1 increase in the tie-proportion in a location, the odds of an entrepreneur 
immediately starting a company after changing locations decrease by a factor of 0.87, holding all 
other variables constant and this estimate is statistically significant (p<0.001). Interpreting 
column 6 in Table 7, for a 0.1 increase in the tie-proportion in a new location, the odds of an 
entrepreneur starting a company in the new location after working for a short while increase by a 
factor of 1.05. This estimate is also statistically significant (p<0.05). 
These estimates support my expectations that the role of social networks (tie-proportion 
in a current location) is an important factor when entrepreneurs are deciding where to start their 
company. Entrepreneurs that decide to move to a new location can capitalize on network ties 
after being in that location for some time and growing their social network. It takes time and 
effort to enrich professional ties. As social beings, personal and professional relationships take 
time to develop trust, needing repeated interactions producing experiences that enable evaluation 
of reputation and character. As these professional ties enhance over time, eventually they can be 
mobilized for resources that benefit both parties in some way. Having a delay between changing 
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locations and starting a company—measured in this case as having a short-term job in the 
destination location before launching the startup—enables entrepreneurs to enrich their 
professional ties in the destination location, acquire additional connections, and use their network 
to mobilize resources (e.g., funding, expertise, talent) needed to start a company. A few initial 
connections in a new location may be instrumental in encouraging an entrepreneur to change 
location and possibly provide help with job transition, but it appears that developing a large 
network in that location is critical to launching the startup. This is intuitive from a network view 
because when a higher percentage of one’s social network is comprised of local ties then the 
business opportunities one can “observe” is locally limited because of one’s position in the social 
structure (Burt 2004).  
Here, a plausible moderating factor is the metropolitan areas’ entrepreneur ecosystem, 
which includes the organization of wealth, startup infrastructure in place, and the metropolitan 
areas’ overall attitude toward startups. Locations with strong entrepreneurial ecosystems have 
formal and informal infrastructure that support networking among those with ambitions to 
launch, work for, or fund new startups. Ecosystems that facilitate social tie formation and 
enrichment among those in the startup community increase tie-proportion. 
Cumulative time spent in a location, that is, “location stickiness” significantly influences 
entrepreneurs when choosing a startup location. The results show that the longer entrepreneurs 
remain in a location, the more likely they are to establish the startup in that location thus 
supporting hypothesis H4a.  From Table 7 (model 2), I see that a one-year increase in cumulative 
time spent in a location increased the odds of starting a company in that location by 1.13 
(statistically significant at 95% level).   Additionally, from Table 7 (model 4), I see that a one-
year increase in cumulative time in a location reduces the odds of starting a company in a 
different location by 0.96 in the move to a new location and start a company immediately 
scenario thus supporting hypothesis H4b. In the move to a new location, work as an employee 
for a short while and then start a company scenario, a one-year increase in cumulative time in a 
location reduces the chances of this happening by 0.89. Both estimates are statistically 
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significant (p<0.001). These estimates correspond to my theoretical expectations suggesting 
some degree of geographic inertia or stickiness in which entrepreneurs’ tend to grow more 
attached to location over time and therefore less likely to move elsewhere to start a company 
(Dahl and Sorenson 2012).  
Next, I interpret the estimates for the metropolitan-level fixed effects, startup funding 
measures, and economic indicators.7 All of the effects for the technopolis variables are lagged by 
one year because recent economic trends are most likely to influence entrepreneurs’ movement 
decisions (i.e., it is unlikely entrepreneurs can gauge and immediately act on real time 
macroeconomic factors for the current year). Moreover, I specified alternative models with no 
lag, two-year lag, and three-year lag for the technopolis variables, and the estimates did not 
significantly change. The location fixed effect controls for location specific, time-invariant 
unobservables such as local government infrastructure or universities. Regarding entrepreneur’s 
choice whether or not to launch a company, the fixed effect was positive and significant for 
several locations including: Atlanta, GA, Austin, TX, Boston, MA, Chicago, IL, Dallas, TX, 
Durham, NC, Los Angeles, CA, Miami, FL, New York, NY, Philadelphia, PA, San Diego, CA, 
San Francisco, CA, and Seattle, WA. This indicates that these locations by themselves have a 
propensity to retain and attract entrepreneurs that will go on to start companies. 
I find an association between funding opportunities for startups in metropolitan areas and 
the movement patterns for entrepreneurs starting a company. The results indicate that locations’ 
funding rounds per year have a positive and significant effect on whether or not an entrepreneur 
decides to change locations, work a job, and then start a company thus supporting hypotheses 
H1a and H1b. Interpreting model 2 in Table 7, a 10 percent increase in the number of funding 
                                                 
7 As a robustness check, I also specified a model using the Milken Institute Best-Performing Cities Index, which 
includes a variety of measures of metro-performance including job, wage, and GDP growth and high-tech industry 
growth. This metro-performance index is a useful proxy for the economic indicators because including the economic 
indicators in the model with location fixed effects renders excessive multicollinearity (high VIF measures because 
the economic variables are highly correlated with location) and thus unintelligible estimates. Metro-performance 
index is a suitable proxy because it is positively correlated with patents and negatively correlated with the 
unemployment rate while removing multicollinearity. The beta estimates did not significantly change, reinforcing 
the results. I can provide these additional estimates in an appendix upon request. 
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rounds per year increases the odds that entrepreneurs will stay in the same locations and start 
their companies by a factor of 1.03, and this estimate is statistically significant (p<0.001). 
Interpreting model 4 in Table 7, a 10 percent increase in the number of funding rounds per year 
increases the odds ratio of the entrepreneur changing locations and starting a company 
immediately by 0.122. Interpreting model 6 in Table 7, a 10 percent increase in the number of 
funding rounds per year increases the odds ratio of the entrepreneur working a short-term job, 
and then starting a company by 0.149. Both estimates are statistically significant (p<0.001 and 
p<0.001, respectively).  
The models also include a measure for the average funding amount per year, but the beta 
estimates were not statistically significant, except for model 2. A 10 percent increase in the 
average funding amount per year increases the odds ratio of entrepreneurs staying in the same 
locations and starting companies by 0.098, and this estimate is statistically significant (p<0.1). 
This was somewhat surprising because one would expect entrepreneurs to be driven by the 
funding amounts. Moreover, although average funding amount and number of funding rounds 
are not strongly correlated (which is why they are simultaneously included in the model 
specifications), I tried removing funding rounds and leaving average funding rounds in the 
specification, but the results did not significantly change. Based on my discussions with 
entrepreneurs and angel investors, I found that, in recent years, digital entrepreneurs usually seek 
small investments from angels and target larger amounts at a much later date. Thus during the 
early phase, they are likely to be attracted to a location that provides more opportunities for 
funding when compared to the amount of funding. To statistically test this, I further re-estimated 
the parameters with an interaction term with funding amount and a dummy for top ranked 
location (based on funding amount). The results sustained and I found no statistical significance 
on including a dummy for top 1 (Silicon Valley), top 2, top 3, top 5, or top 10 locations (based 
on funding amounts).  
As a result, entrepreneurs believe that the larger number of funding rounds in a location is 
an indicator of more opportunity for securing funding for their startup. Additionally, because 
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startups are typically funded in stages (Gompers and Lerner 2010), entrepreneurs likely associate 
more funding rounds in a location with a higher likelihood that their startup will continue to 
receive additional funding rounds beyond any initial investment capital. In short, entrepreneurs 
tend to gravitate towards places where they have more opportunity for funding. 
Before introducing location fixed effects, I observe positive yet non-significant 
coefficients for the number of patents (in Table 7, models 1, 3, and 5), which is consistent with 
the prior work that documents positive and significant association between patents, productivity 
and innovation at the metropolitan level (Rothwell et al. 2013). Thus hypotheses H2a and H2b 
are partially supported in that patents play a positive role but are not significant in the analysis. 
This could be the case because technologically advanced firms may want to distance themselves 
from competitors (Alcacer and Chung 2007). I find a negative (and significant) association 
between the unemployment rate and entrepreneurs choosing to remain in the same location and 
start a company, and moving to a different location to launch a startup after working for a short 
duration. I also found a negative (and significant) association between the number of employed 
persons and relocating entrepreneurs starting a company immediately after changing locations 
and after working short-term. This large employment base could suggest that local culture is 
favorable to employees while at the same time when unemployment rate is high the local 
community may not provide enough resources to develop and grow a startup. 
As explained above, I find a positive and significant influence of entrepreneur’s tie-
proportion on propensity to start a company in the same location as pre-entrepreneurship 
engagement. However, one might suggest that evolution of tie-proportion in a location be 
correlated with an individual’s tenure in that location. While I do not have time series data on the 
evolution of social networks, I address this concern by testing the results by simulating the tie-
proportion in a metropolitan area based on entrepreneurs’ tenures in current and past locations. A 
well-documented finding in the literature is that relationships are more likely to develop between 
co-located persons. In many social contexts, the likelihood of any tie formation decreases rapidly 
as the physical distance separating two parties increases (Baker 1984, Bossard 1932, Kono et al. 
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1998a, Sorenson and Stuart 2001). At the dyadic level, co-location increases the likelihood of 
interaction between two parties and there is a tendency toward mutuality in relations over time 
because of the social pressure to reciprocate interactions (Gouldner 1960). Because tie-
proportion is simply the connections in a location divided by the total connections in all 
locations, a dynamic conception of entrepreneurs’ tie-proportion is a function of the tenure in 
current and past locations. Formally, this new measure of tie-proportion is:  
 
𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑗𝜏 =
𝑛𝑖𝑗 ∗ ( ∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡∈[0,𝜏] )/(∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡∈[0,𝑇] )
∑ (𝑛𝑖𝑗 ∗ (∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡∈[0,𝜏] )/(∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡∈[0,𝑇] ))𝑗
 
Here, td is the time varying tie-proportion of an individual, t is a dummy representing a 
unit of time spent in location j by individual i, n the observed number of ties of individual i in 
location j, and τ represents the time period in consideration. It is worth noting that the 
denominator of this tie-proportion also changes when an individual has a smaller number of 
connections in a location. Thus, I converted the static view of tie-proportion per location into a 
time varying dynamic tie-proportion panel. As shown in Table 8, the significance and valence of 
results hold with this test. The assumption is there is a linear correlation of tie-proportion 
evolution with tenure in location. I leave the possibility of a non-linear relationship between 
social connections and tenure for further investigation under a standalone research paper.  
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Logistic regression estimates for entrepreneur startups in same/different locations (with tie-proportion panel) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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Observations 4933 6665 4933 6648 4933 6225 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table 8: Logistic regression estimates for entrepreneur startups in same/different locations (with tie-proportion panel)
 
 74 
Additionally, I observe that entrepreneurs are less likely to return to a 
metropolitan area if their tenure in a new location increases (see Figures 15 and 16). The 
likelihood of moving back to an original location is a function of the number of years 
they have lived outside that metro area. As a result, individuals will have smaller local 
social networks in a new location during the initial year and have a high probability of 
moving back to any of the prior locations. When they start building social networks in 
new locations, the likelihood of them staying and starting a company becomes higher. 




Figure 15: Histogram of tenure at different locations for entrepreneurs not returning to 
original location 
                                                 
8 I ran several additional robustness checks which did not significantly impact the estimates or key 
findings. To list a few, I ran logistic regression models that incorporated the total number of endorsement 
ties in the specification. The estimates did not significantly change. I also ran models on a subset of single-
founder entrepreneurs to control for bias from serial entrepreneurs. The estimates did not significantly 





Figure 16: Histogram of tenure at different locations for entrepreneurs returning to 
original location 
DISCUSSION 
This paper makes several important contributions to the literature on technology 
entrepreneurship and regional advantage. This analysis is among the few that measures 
and examines the role of both aggregated metropolitan economic indicators and 
individual-level factors that influence individual (re)location decisions (Dahl and 
Sorenson 2009, Figueiredo, Guimaraes and Woodward 2002). As detailed above, prior 
work has focused on the influence of regional economic factors and agglomeration 
economies that yield high rates of spin-offs and subsequent clustering of innovative 
firms. Recognizing that the creation of a new venture is principally an individual decision 
made by a founding entrepreneur, the analysis uses an original dataset of entrepreneur 
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career paths with direct observation of personal connections, in addition to key economic 
and investment factors, to model the location and entrepreneurial choice of individuals. 
This analysis differs from and extends prior work in several important ways. I 
utilize rich data from a popular social networking platform to directly measure an 
individual’s networks in particular locations and in turn evaluate the influence of social 
connections on the entrepreneur’s decision where the launch the startup. Without access 
to recent data sources enabled by digital networking platforms, prior work relied on 
indirect proxy measurements for network proportion such as generic high school 
classmates (Dahl and Sorenson 2010), the physical distance between an entrepreneur’s 
residential address and the addresses of their hometown, parents, and siblings (Dahl and 
Sorenson 2009).  
In contrast, my analysis leverages a direct and clear measure of entrepreneurs 
professional and social network proportion in particular locations. Moreover, the data 
focuses on the location-choice decisions by founders of technology ventures that were 
founded in the prominent technology clusters like San Francisco Bay Area, Boston, 
Austin, and New York. Prior work investigated Danish founders of mostly non-tech 
companies in traditional industries like hospitality, food, business services, and 
construction. Moreover, this earlier work primarily conceptualized social networks as 
family and friend connections (Dahl and Sorenson 2009), which is perhaps more 
appropriate for successfully launching new non-tech businesses primarily serving local 
clientele. A broader measure of professional social networks is more appropriate for the 
investigation of technology ventures, which often require richer social capital with 
connections to technological expertise, tacit knowledge (Sorenson and Audia 2000), and 
more specialized resources (Ferrary and Granovetter 2009), which are less likely to be 
found in the narrower family-friends network. 
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The results presented here have significant managerial and policy implications. 
First, conceptual frameworks like the “technopolis” or entrepreneurship ecosystem have 
been heavily influential in recent  decades among public officials and business leaders, 
shaping public policy and business investments in major American cities like Austin 
(Gibson and Butler 2013) and Boston as well as many international cities around the 
globe (Gibson and Butler 2011, Fetters et al. 2010, p. 120). Yet the data was not available 
to operationalize and measure the individual-level factors and key economic indicators 
that influence entrepreneur (re)location decisions, which is central to refueling and 
sustaining technology clusters. The empirical analysis is a novel investigation of an 
unmeasured and untested theoretical construct known as the “technopolis wheel” and the 
results identify factors that are critical for cultivating existing entrepreneurial talent and 
attracting outside individuals with entrepreneurial ambition.  
Specifically, the findings indicate that an entrepreneur's decision to start a 
company in a specific location is partially driven by the number of funding rounds in that 
location. It was surprising that the amount of funding available in a location did not have 
a statistically significant impact on entrepreneurs’ relocation choices prior to launching 
startups. Given that the number of funding rounds has a significantly positive impact in 
entrepreneur location choice, state and city policy makers might think about policies that 
encourage the organization of angel networks groups, which fund much more seed 
investment rounds relative to the large dollar capital infusions by VC firms. These 
policies might include financial and other regulatory incentives. This seems particularly 
relevant to declining industrial metropolitan areas with stagnating local economies, which 
are striving to encourage local entrepreneurship and retain local talent that is flowing to 
cities like the San Francisco Bay Area, Austin, Boston, and Seattle. Access to sufficient 
investment is widely perceived, in the entrepreneurial community, to be the dominant 
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impediment to startup success. Thus, future studies should further test this association, 
perhaps exploring potential moderating factors that could establish indirect relationships.  
Additionally, I see that social network proportion plays a strong role in keeping an 
individual in a location (stickiness) and plays a significant role in attracting the potential 
entrepreneur to a different location to begin startup operations. I also observe that 
distances for relocation are not significant predictors anymore. Policy implications of the 
findings suggest that entrepreneurial talent that is locally embedded is less likely to move 
elsewhere when starting a company. This suggests that activities and policies that 
promote social tie formation and local embeddedness might encourage entrepreneurs to 
remain in that location to launch their company, which will likely yield positive benefits 
for the local economy. For example, local government or local business managers/owners 
might consider sponsoring attractive social events (e.g., meetups, networking events, 
concerts/arts/culture) like SXSW, which facilitate interpersonal interaction and in turn 
promote social tie formation and potentially enhance entrepreneurial activity. Moreover, 
this suggests public and business information systems that facilitate communication and 
interaction among groups/organization with a local community are likely to promote 
positive spillover effects for the local economy.  
Furthermore, the result showing the influence of social networks for entrepreneurs 
starting companies in a new location, shortly after moving there, suggests entrepreneurial 
talent might launch ventures in locations where expanding one’s network is easier and 
where there are lower barriers to accessing key resources through networked connections. 
For example, the entrepreneurial ecosystem in the San Francisco Bay area and New York 
City are notorious for the “gatekeeping” process to networking, which inhibit quick 
access to resources like new venture capital. In contrast, locations like Austin or Seattle 
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are reported by entrepreneurs to have more decentralized resource networks, which 
facilitates access to financial and other key resources. 
Over the last 5 decades we have seen Silicon Valley, Boston, New York, San 
Diego, and Austin attract increasing numbers of tech-entrepreneurs. Most of the extant 
research attributes this rise of startups to favorable economic conditions offered by each 
of the locations. This research dives deeper and considers entrepreneurs’ characteristics 
and their social networks to investigate, at the micro-level, entrepreneurial and relocation 
decision-making. As more data becomes available, scholars should put quantitative 
measurement to the many qualitative narratives that have developed concerning 
technology entrepreneurship. This research takes the first step in identifying the role that 
social networks, investment, and economic indicators have on technology 
entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, future research can further refine this analysis to better 
understand the selection of a specific location over multiple choices that were not 
selected. This could enable a better understanding of the rise of selected entrepreneurial 
hubs in the country.  
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Chapter 3: Entrepreneurial Ecosystems and Developing Networks: 
Austin, Boston, Silicon Valley, and New York 
This study investigates the entrepreneurial ecosystems of Silicon Valley, Austin, 
Boston, and New York, which have established themselves as innovation-centered 
business clusters and entrepreneurial “talent magnets”. I examine the factors that 
influence start-up activity by analyzing entrepreneurs who (1) elect to remain in a region, 
(2) those that move to a different region to start a company, and (3) those that move to a 
region, enter an occupation, and then start a company. Following a brief overview of each 
region, I specify models testing the importance of investment funding, social network 
ties, education, cumulative work experience and other factors in entrepreneurs’ location 
choice decisions. I find that entrepreneur network ties in Austin and Silicon Valley are an 
important factor in retaining potential entrepreneurs. I also find that the number of 
funding rounds per year, or frequency of funding opportunities, influences whether or not 
entrepreneurs move elsewhere to start a new venture. 
INTRODUCTION 
Regional advantage stems from the geographic concentration of innovative 
industries that constantly yield spin-offs that refuel the hub. In these regions, many 
scholars have explained how innovation and entrepreneurship is derived from the 
dynamic interactions of embedded agents in a complex web of networks (Ferrary and 
Granovetter 2009, Powell 1996, Powell et al. 2002). There are several theoretical 
frameworks that describe this geographic agglomeration of business activity including: 
business clusters (Porter 1990, Porter 1998), business ecosystem (Moore 1993, Moore 
1996), and networks of innovation (Saxenian 1994) among others. All the frameworks 
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stress the importance of spinoffs (Klepper 2010) and institutional support structures 
(Owen Smith and Powell 2005). 
Building on the analysis in chapter 2 (above), I investigate the structural and 
cultural dynamics of four geographically distinct entrepreneurial ecosystems: Silicon 
Valley, Austin, Boston, and New York. Among entrepreneurs in the database collected 
and analyzed in this study (described in chapter 2 and below), these four locations were 
prominent destinations for launching technology startups (see Figure 14). Moreover, the 
literature on these regions have established these locations as technology innovation-
centered business clusters and “talent magnets” with varying degrees of entrepreneurial 
success. Examined as 4 case studies, I investigate the selected ecosystems in three ways.  
First, I detail the historical development of the entrepreneurial ecosystem in each 
location, with a particular focus on the institutional structures that helped develop the 
innovation-centered business cluster. Second, I specify the same empirical model 
(detailed in chapter 2) separately for each location. This analysis helps show whether 
there is location-specific variation in the influence of factors like social networks, 
funding opportunities, and economic factors on entrepreneur location choice. Third, I 
supplement the descriptive and empirical analyses with an analysis of interview data from 
technology entrepreneurs with experience in these locations. The interview responses 
explain how structural and cultural factors within ecosystems facilitate social capital 
formation. The findings describe the key structural factors entrepreneurs utilize in 
developing their network and highlight similarities and differences in the structural and 
cultural dynamics inherent to different ecosystems. Altogether, the analysis helps to 
explain some of the variation in the influence of social networks, funding opportunities, 
and economic factors on the location and entrepreneurial choice of individuals. 
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REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: INSTITUTIONS AND ECOSYSTEMS 
The literature on regional advantage offers several explanations for why particular 
regions have prospered. The relationship between creative environments and creative 
regions can be traced to the analysis of regional clustering of firms (Marshall 1920, 
Porter 1990) and the innovation-centered business clusters (Dorfman 1983, Feldman 
2000, Hellmann 2000, Kenney and Von Burg 1999, Saxenian 1994, Steiner 1998). 
Regional advantage stems from the geographic concentration of innovative industries that 
constantly yield spin-offs that refuel the hub. Geographically concentrated business 
clusters offer several advantages to new ventures. Clusters often specialize in a particular 
industry or technology and in turn attract key suppliers and labor talent to the area 
(Sorenson and Audia 2000). This provides new firms with lower cost access to material 
and human resources, providing competitive advantages that stem from economies of 
scale, reduction of transaction costs, and capturing spillover demand (Krugman and 
Obstfeld 1997, Porter 1990). 
Research on high technology regions increasingly uses institutional theory as a 
guiding framework to help to explain entrepreneurial success (Foss and Gibson 2015). 
The institutionalist view recognizes these clusters develop robust networks of 
institutional support corresponding to the cluster’s industry focus. Institutional structures 
that are important to regional advantage include universities, incubators and business 
accelerators, investments groups (e.g., angel networks, venture capital), large established 
enterprises, and legal and financial service organizations. In Boston, Owen-Smith and 
Powell (2004) document how various public and private institutions were deeply 
embedded in an inter-organizational network of formal and informal relations, which 
encouraged information spillover and helped fuel the “Route 128” biotechnology 
business cluster. In an important study, Smilor, Gibson and Kozmetsky (1989) developed 
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the conceptual framework of the technopolis wheel (see Figure 17), which emphasized 
the key importance of academic, business, and government sectors and concentrated on 
how new institutional alliances could drive strategy and tactics of technology-based 
economic development. 
 
Figure 17: Measuring components of the technopolis wheel 
Borrowing from ecology, Moore (1993) conceptualized this agglomeration of 
interconnected firms as a business ecosystem in which a variety of organizations 
coevolve around an innovation. Moore (1996) also stressed the idea that these geographic 
clusters are a magnet for talented people and interfirm collaboration alongside 
competition. These forces contributed to the diffusion of best practices throughout the 
ecosystem. These creative environments, which allow for competitive strategy, enhance 
interpersonal relationships, are often characterized by periods of relative stability and 
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incremental change punctuated by major technological shifts that yield rapid changes 
(Scott 2014). Over time, technological breakthroughs displace prior innovations in waves 
of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1942). While few organizations can adapt and 
survive, healthy ecosystems yield new institutional networks that coevolve around the 
new frontier of innovation. In this view, entrepreneurs launch new ventures more 
frequently in these locations because these ecosystems allow individuals to accumulate 
the knowledge, social ties, and confidence necessary to mobilize resources for launching 
and sustaining a new venture. Thus, higher founding rates, not lower failure rates, sustain 
agglomerations (Sorenson and Audia 2000).  
In the U.S., Silicon Valley, Boston, and Austin are three geographically 
concentrated innovation ecosystems that have yielded the most technology ventures. 
There is a large body of literature on each location (Butler 2010, Etzkowitz and Dzisah 
2008, Kozmetsky, Gill and Smilor 1985, Owen Smith and Powell 2005, Powell et al. 
2002, Saxenian 1994, Smilor, Gibson and Kozmetsky 1989). However, this literature 
does not investigate regional variation in the social, economic, and structural factors that 
influence entrepreneurs’ location choice decisions. Research has noted that the key to 
developing regional economies lies not only in the development of institutional 
structures, but also the attraction of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial talent to those 
regions (Florida 2005). 
Building on this prior work, this chapter focuses on four case studies and 
investigates institutional structures and other individual and metropolitan-level factors 
that shape the location choice of entrepreneurs in each region. The next section provides 
some background on development of the entrepreneurial ecosystem in Silicon Valley, 
Austin, Boston, and New York City.  
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ENTREPRENEURIAL ECOSYSTEMS: METRO BACKGROUNDS 
San Francisco Bay Area (Silicon Valley) 
For the last several decades, Silicon Valley and the greater San Francisco Bay 
area has been the “800-pound gorilla” of innovation-centered business clusters and 
technology startups. Silicon Valley is the unquestionable global hub of entrepreneurship 
and innovation in a full spectrum of industries including software, information 
technology, Internet, social media, and biotechnology. Silicon Valley is a highly-
concentrated cluster of technology firms, research institutions (e.g., Stanford, UC 
Berkeley), and venture capital and angel investment firms. In 2015, total venture capital 
investment for the greater Silicon Valley region reached $24.5 billion ($11.13 billion in 
Silicon Valley, and $13.34 billion in San Francisco), which is 42% of the total U.S. 
venture capital investment (Joint Venture Silicon Valley, 2016). Software investments 
comprise more than half (52%) of all Silicon Valley 2015 VC funding while smaller 
proportions went into other industries like biotechnology (13%), IT services (6%), and 
industrial/energy (5%). In 2014, total angel investment for the greater Silicon Valley 
region was $4.1 billion (roughly $1.8 billion in Silicon Valley, and $2.3 billion in San 
Francisco) (Joint Venture Silicon Valley, 2016). 
Many prior studies detail the origins and development of the innovation-fueled 
business ecosystem in Silicon Valley (Castilla et al. 2000, Saxenian 1994). The Silicon 
Valley ecosystem successfully capitalized on each new wave of creative destruction 
initiated by each successive technological innovation (Henton and Held 2013, 
Schumpeter 1942). Although important to each regional cluster, spin-off firms are 
particularly important to understanding regional advantage in Silicon Valley (Saxenian 
1994). In the 1950s, rapid growth in the semiconductor industry started in Silicon Valley 
with Shockley Semiconductor Laboratories (founded in 1956). Shockley Labs started 
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attracting scientific talent, including many leading academics from STEM fields like 
engineering, math, and physics and their top graduate students. Fairchild Semiconductor 
was the key spin-off (founded in 1957).  
The concentration of scientific and engineering talent in Fairchild eventually 
yielded many spin-offs including Intel, Advanced Micro Devices, and National 
Semiconductor. The invention of microprocessors at Intel in 1971 paved the way for the 
next technological wave in personal computers (1970s and 1980s). Bolstered by the 
concentration of talent, support industries, venture capital, and a culture that praised 
creative risk-taking (Saxenian 1994), newly developed personal computer companies 
(e.g., Apple and Hewlett-Packard) made computers a home commodity. The proliferation 
of personal computers in every home made the Internet and World Wide Web possible. 
This helped spawn the next wave of spin-off firms based on the Internet and information 
technology (e.g., Netscape and Cisco). In turn, Internet and information technology 
companies fueled rapid growth in software and computer-related employment, which 
further helped the Silicon Valley retain and attract ambitious and entrepreneurial talent.  
Finally, this wave fueled the current wave of spin-offs in Internet and social 
media (e.g. Google, Facebook, Twitter, Airbnb, Uber). Silicon Valley ecosystem also 
supports starts biotechnology (e.g., 23andMe) and clean-technology (e.g., Tesla). 
Throughout this process, the spin-offs founded the new ventures near the parent 
organization (for the economic and social benefits discussed above) (see Sorenson and 
Audia 2000), which further attracted key resources like talent, support industries, and 
venture capital. Strong regional growth in Silicon Valley (in 2015, 4.3% employment 
growth rate and 3.6% unemployment rate) has led to a geographic expansion from the 
region’s core in Santa Clara County (e.g., Palo Alto, Cupertino, San Jose) to adjacent 
parts of San Mateo, Alameda and Santa Cruz counties (e.g., San Francisco, Fremont, 
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Gilroy). This expanded area covers 1,845 sq. miles and, in 2015, reported a large, diverse 
population of 3 million with strong foreign immigration (net +14,338) (Joint Venture 
Silicon Valley, 2016). 
Beyond the concentration of resources, Saxenian (1994) emphasized the role of an 
innovative risk-taking culture in Silicon Valley as well as the critical role of research 
universities. Venture capital firms (VCs) in Silicon Valley had distinct financing 
objectives that strongly encouraged aggressive risk-taking (Saxenian 1994). Venture 
capital and angel networks are important to innovation clusters because they finance most 
new technology ventures and facilitate interactions and the creation of new ties between 
key players in the entrepreneur ecosystem. In Silicon Valley, VCs are central to the 
innovation clusters because they fund most successful new ventures (Ferrary and 
Granovetter 2009). 
Austin, Texas 
Austin is the capital of Texas and home to The University of Texas at Austin, and 
other private and public colleges and universities. Historically, employment opportunities 
in Austin revolved around the state government, colleges and universities, and small 
private firms. In contrast to the emergence of the high-tech business cluster in Silicon 
Valley, the Austin technology cluster was more the consequence of strategically 
planning. The transformation of Austin into a technology hub for innovation and 
entrepreneurship began with the vision of George Kozmetsky, who created a strategy to 
transform the city into a high-tech region to augment opportunities in other parts of the 
state mostly centered on the oil and gas industry. Kozmetsky created the Institute for 
Constructive Capitalism (IC2), and its laboratory the Austin Technology Incubator, to be 
institutional catalysts for transforming Austin into an innovation-centered business 
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cluster. One of the first companies in the Austin Technology Incubator was Pencom 
Software, which was admitted in 1989. Since its inception, IC2 has launched over 150 
companies, raised over $750 million dollars in investor funds for member companies, 
created initial public offerings, and had many companies acquired (Butler 2010).  
Smilor, Gibson and Kozmetsky (1989) developed the technopolis wheel 
framework to explain the emergence of the high-tech cluster in Austin (see Figure 17). 
The technopolis wheel is composed of distinct institutional spokes including major 
research universities (e.g., UT Austin), technology companies and spin-offs (e.g., 
Tracor), federal, state, and local government, and support groups (e.g., angel networks, 
chamber of commerce). The institutional resources can be in place, but the cluster does 
not self-assemble. In this framework, networks of key influencers embedded in each 
institutional segment interact with other key influencers to form important institutional 
alliances, which in turn promoted the high-tech economic development of the Austin 
cluster (Smilor et al. 1989, Powers 2004). Austin’s ecosystem changed quickly as the 
technopolis framework helped spur partnerships with the chamber of commerce, wealthy 
investors, industry, and universities/research laboratories. A Harvard-Business case study 
of the Austin technopolis model reported that this introduced a paradigm of technology-
driven economic development driven by interlocking relationships between academia, 
business and government (Butler 2010). 
In the 1990s Austin was one of the hubs for high-tech firms. The early business 
face of Austin, Dell Computers (whom Kozmetsky helped to mentor as Chairman of the 
Board).  Other companies included Motorola, IBM, Applied Materials and Tracor (an 
early company founded as early as 1955). Kozmetsky’s technopolis was given a boost in 
1983 when Austin won a very competitive national competition that included over 50 
localities, to bring the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC) to 
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the city (Smilor, Gibson and Kozmetsky 1989). Today, many of the Fortune 500 
companies that are located in Austin include Apple, ARM holdings, eBay, Cisco, General 
Motors, Google, Intel, Texas Instruments, 3M, and Oracle Corporation. During the past 
few decades, Austin has produced firms like National Instruments, Dell Computers, 
Whole foods, Evolutionary Technologies, FreeScale (originally Metrowerks), and 
Golfsmith. Other homegrown companies include Uship, HotSchedules, Golden Frog, 
Alchemy, and Glofish. Austin is also celebrated for its lively culture—nicknamed the 
Live Music Capital of the World and home to Austin City Limits and SXSW Music 
Festival. 
Today the Austin ranks highest on the Kauffman Foundation’s Startup Activity 
Index, derived from the number of new entrepreneurs, startup density, and percent of 
entrepreneurs starting companies because of perceived market opportunities (Morelix et 
al. 2015). There is robust institutional support for startups in the Austin ecosystem. As of 
June 2017, I identified 39 entrepreneurial support “spaces” (e.g., incubators, accelerators, 
and co-working spaces) in greater Austin. From 2005 to 2016, thirteen “incubators” and 
25 co-working spaces were launched in Austin. The culture, structure, amenities, and 
impact of these recently established entities has yet to be determined, but they have 
clearly provided increased visibility and support for Austin entrepreneurs. In 2015, angel 
network investors in greater Austin invested over $13 million in 43 companies (Central 
Texas Angel Network 2016). Venture capitalists infused $740 million in 99 Austin-area 
companies in 2015, far outpacing larger Texas cities like Dallas ($214 million) and 
Houston ($160 million) (MoneyTreeTM Report from PricewaterhouseCoopers and the 




The greater Boston area (including Cambridge) has a robust technology startup 
ecosystem and central to one the largest geographic agglomerations of biotechnology 
firms in the world. In 2015, venture capitalists invested in 486 VC deals totaling $6.7 
billion, which is roughly 5.3% of global VC investment (PitchBook 2016). In Boston, 
biotechnology is the largest sector of VC investment, receiving $2.9 billion in 91 
biotechnology startups, second only to Silicon Valley and vastly outpaces all other 
regions. Software is the second largest sector with 160 Boston-based software startups 
receiving $1.6 billion in VC funding. While Silicon Valley slightly edges Boston in 
aggregate VC investment, Boston has an unparalleled concentration of elite public and 
private research institutions, including research universities (e.g., Harvard, MIT, Tufts, 
Northeastern), research hospitals (Brigham and Women’s, Massachusetts General), 
medical research institutes (Dana Farber Cancer Center), and international leaders in the 
Human Genome Project (Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research). Boston is also 
the R&D headquarters for major multinational pharmaceutical firms (e.g., Pfizer, 
Novartis) and Amgen (the largest biotech firm in annual sales). 
Prior research traces the origins of Boston’s biotech startup boom to the late 
1970s and early 1980s with the founding of two major biotech pharmaceutical ventures, 
Biogen and Genzyme. Both firms were founded by leading scientists from nearby 
universities, which sparked other researchers and academics to launch their own startups. 
Largely fueled by public research funding, the Boston area eventually developed a robust 
venture capital sector during the 1990s, which further fueled the number of new biotech 
startups (Powell et al. 2002). To get a sense of the diverse and rich biotech ecosystem in 
Boston, between 1988 and 1999, Owen-Smith and Powell (2004) report that greater 
Boston had a total of 57 independent biotech firms, 19 public research organizations, and 
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37 venture capital firms. These organizations were deeply embedded through a dense 
network of formal and informal relationships (Owen-Smith and Powell 2004). 
Other research contends that the strong public research presence in the Boston 
ecosystem has left an institutional imprint on Boston-based biotech firms.  Owen Smith 
and Powell (2005) document how Boston-based biotech companies often focus their 
R&D on orphan medicines and therapeutic treatments for well-known patient groups. In 
contrast, R&D at Silicon Valley biotech firms often swing for “home-runs”, that is, 
pioneering first-ever medicines aimed at large global markets.   
New York 
With a population of 22,000,000 New York City (NYC) is the largest metropolis 
in the US. NYC has historically thrived on competition, innovative ideas, diversity, 
resilience, and determination, which make it a breeding ground for entrepreneurial 
activity (Stringer 2012). The high-tech industry’s young, creative talent is attracted to 
NYC because of the education and career opportunities, ethnic diversity, creative and 
entertainment industries, and NYC’s distinct urban lifestyle. 
One key advantage of NYC’s technology industry is its cultural and ethnic 
diversity. The continued influx of skilled immigrants is important to expanding the talent 
base sought by high-tech firms. A 2013 report from the Office of the State of New York 
Comptroller showed that immigrants played a significant role in the high tech economy. 
Immigrants were employed in over one-third of many of the high-playing technology 
jobs (e.g., computer systems design, software publishing, and data processing and hosting 
services) (DiNapoli and Bleiwas 2014). Forty percent of the city’s tech employees are 
women and a fifth are people of color. Part of the reason New York has more diverse tech 
workers is because the companies in NYC offer a wide range of technology jobs. Many 
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non-American startups use NYC as their American or North American headquarters, 
bringing in talented workers with international perspectives.   
As of late 2013, NYC was home to 6,970 high-tech firms and high-tech 
employment was one of the fastest growing industries (DiNapoli and Bleiwas 2014). 
More than half of the high-tech sector jobs in NYC (56,000 jobs) were related to 
designing, managing and operating computer systems and digital media (such as Internet 
publishing and broadcasting). While software accounted for only 2 percent of high-tech 
jobs, it had the fastest rate of growth (58 percent). In addition, new digital and mobile 
technologies bolstered new ventures in NYC’s advertising, publishing, media, design and 
entertainment industries (Bloomberg Technology Summit, 2013).   
In NYC, the public and private sectors have launched many initiatives to help 
support entrepreneurship and the emerging high-tech industry by nurturing a skilled 
workforce. In 2011, Cornell University and Technion (Israel Institute of Technology) 
made significant infrastructure investments towards expanding their applied sciences and 
engineering campuses based on a land grant on Roosevelt Island. In another initiative, 
New York University (NYU), the City of New York, and several large tech firms 
partnered to launch NYU’s Center for Urban Science and Progress (NYU CUSP)—a 
research center and graduate school focused on leveraging “big data” for creative 
enterprises and addressing major urban problems around the globe (Kickul and Mulloth 
2015).  
In another public-private partnership, the Polytechnic Institute (NYU Poly) and 
the New York City Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC) worked together to 
launch several initiatives geared towards supporting local technology entrepreneurship. 
For example, the Varick Street Incubator provides affordable office space and business 
supplies/services in prime real estate in lower Manhattan. Other initiatives include the 
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NYC Accelerator, the DUMBO Incubator, and most recently a Clean Technology 
Entrepreneur Center. Moreover, Columbia University established the Institute for Data 
Sciences and Engineering in Morningside Heights and Carnegie Mellon University 
invested in an Integrative Media Program at the Brooklyn Navy Yard (Kickul and 
Mulloth 2015). 
Furthermore, with its proximity to Wall Street and a growing venture capital 
community, NYC-based technology firms have access to large and diverse funding 
opportunities. In 2013, venture capital firms invested $1.3 billion in 222 high-tech 
companies in the NYC metropolitan region, according to the MoneyTree Report 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and the National Venture Capital Association, with Thomson 
Reuters’ data. This ranked third among the nation’s regions, following Silicon Valley and 
New England. Since the end of the last recession, high-tech venture capital investment in 
the NYC metropolitan region has doubled, growing at the same rate as in Silicon Valley 
and more than twice the rate of growth in New England. However, despite a population 
roughly eight times as large as San Francisco and being the global financial hub for the 
world’s largest banks, NYC tech firms raised just 5 percent of the VC funds while Silicon 
Valley area companies received roughly 15 percent of the world’s venture capital. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL FORMATION IN ENTREPRENEURIAL ECOSYSTEMS 
The analysis in this chapter focuses on the subset of entrepreneurs who started 
companies in at least one of four major technology startup hubs (Austin, Silicon Valley, 
Boston, New York) to learn more about the metropolitan and individual-level factors 
influencing the geographic movement of entrepreneurs. In addition to modeling factors 
that influence entrepreneurs’ location choice in each of the four case study locations, I 
also analyze interview data collected from technology entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs’ 
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launching new ventures have particular needs such as a technically skilled labor force, 
technological expertise, financial capital, and specialized legal or accounting support 
(Ferrary and Granovetter 2009, Kenney and Von Burg 1999). In addition to having a 
concentrated supply of these resources, I expect more robust entrepreneurial ecosystems 
will have structures that facilitate interaction and networking among entrepreneurs and 
key resources. I investigate the role these structures play in entrepreneurs’ social capital 
formation, and how the role of these structures may vary based on the regional 
ecosystem. 
Social Capital 
Although important to individuals at all types of organizations, social capital is a 
foundational theoretical concept in entrepreneurship (Sorenson and Rogan 2014) and 
critical to the creation and development of new ventures. The three main theorists on the 
subject—Bourdieu, Coleman, and, Lin—define social capital in somewhat different 
ways, but they all conceive it as the resources embedded in social relations of individuals 
or groups (Bourdieu 1986:241-258; Coleman 1988:98-104; Lin 2001:29). They also all 
argued that four types of resources constitute social capital: information, the influence 
that networks have over people, the social credentials that networks can convert, and the 
personal/social value that supports mental health. Arguably most appropriate in the 
context of entrepreneurship, this chapter takes Lin’s definition of social capital as the 
“resources embedded in a social structure that are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive 
actions.” (Lin 2001:29). This definition stresses not only the purposive but also the 
rational nature of investments in social capital, mainly the capacity to utilize resources in 
one’s network. In this way, social capital is flexible enough to constitute various 
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entrepreneurship-related resources (e.g., funding, strategic advice, technology expertise, 
legal and accounting support etc.). 
Entrepreneurs build social capital by creating and maintaining network ties. 
Social capital is particularly vital to entrepreneurs because it enables them to locate, 
access, and mobilize key resources (Davidsson and Honig 2003) such as financial capital 
(Hallen and Eisenhardt 2012, Shane and Cable 2002), talent, mentors, advisors and board 
members, and emotional support. Having more network ties reduces new ventures’ 
liabilities of newness and smallness (Hite and Hesterly 2001) and increases the likelihood 
of survival from hostile external shocks (Venkataraman and Van de Ven 1998). Prior 
work also shows a positive association between social capital and firm performance 
(Baum, Calabrese and Silverman 2000), venture growth (Maurer and Ebers 2006, Vissa 
and Chacar 2009), and opportunity recognition and innovation (Cooper and Park 2008, 
Tsai and Ghoshal 1998, Uzzi 1997). Most studies have focused on the consequences of 
social capital, meaning outcomes derived from the structure of the networks in which 
individuals are embedded (Stam, Arzlanian and Elfring 2014). However, from both a 
theoretical and practical view, it is important to address the general question: how do 
entrepreneurs build social capital in these ecosystems? 
Structures Facilitating Social Capital Formation 
How do entrepreneurs build network ties to access key resources? To address this 
question, I conceptualize social capital formation as the interaction of network structure 
and process. The interaction consists of two concepts: 1) through what structures/entities 
(e.g., persons, organizations, groups, communities) do the entrepreneurs 
locate/access/mobilize a resource, and 2) what actions/behaviors do the entrepreneurs 
perform in creating/managing network ties that enable them to locate/access/mobilize a 
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resource. The first concept focuses on the network structures that facilitate contact 
between the entrepreneurs and other individuals (resources). The second concept details 
the networking process, referring to the networking actions or “behavioral repertoires” 
utilized to create and manage interpersonal ties (Vissa 2012). In a future study, I will 
analyze the networking process of entrepreneurs in ecosystem. This chapter focuses the 
analysis on interview responses that describe the structures within ecosystems that were 
supportive in the entrepreneurs’ networking activity and social capital formation. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data Sources and Collection 
For the empirical analysis, I constructed a database of entrepreneurs’ employment 
histories using individual LinkedIn profiles and startup investment data from the 
MoneyTree™ Report from PricewaterhouseCoopers and the National Venture Capital 
Association based on data provided by Thomson Reuters. I randomly sampled startups 
based on historical startup investment data by region from PwC (1,765 startups). Of these 
startups, I selected only nascent entrepreneurs (551) that started a company in Austin, 
Silicon Valley, Boston, or New York (the four largest locations). Using LinkedIn public 
profiles, I identified the startup founders/co-founders of these startups and accessed the 
complete LinkedIn profile web pages for these startups. The profiles pages contained 
self-reported education and job histories including titles, dates, locations, as well as the 
entrepreneurs’ endorsement network. I standardized the self-reported job locations by 
geocoding and mapping onto metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).  
I selected 68 large MSAs and then collapsed all geocoded locations 
(latitude/longitude coordinates) listed by entrepreneurs and endorsers to the nearest 
metropolitan area within 100 miles. I used aggregate city-level investment data from 
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CrunchBase, a comprehensive self-reported database for startup funding and activity, to 
compute the MSA-level investment information. For patent data at the metropolitan level, 
I used the Strumsky Patent Database (Strumsky 2014) that contains annual counts for 
patents granted by the US Patent and Trademark office between 1975 and 2013 (Bearman 
1997). 
I used LinkedIn endorsements rather than generic LinkedIn connections to 
measure the entrepreneurs’ social networks. An endorsement tie is established on 
LinkedIn when a member of an entrepreneur’s network endorses him/her for a 
professional/technical skill or attribute (e.g., leadership, creativity, technology). With 
increasing number of connections on online social networks that are dominantly 
comprised of weak-ties (De Meo et al. 2014), it is important for empirical analysis to 
consider ties that are likely to establish causal outcomes. These endorsements are 
voluntarily made by individuals in one’s network and suggest some reasonable degree of 
familiarity with the endorser. Therefore, endorsement ties are expected to be stronger ties 
when compared to a generic LinkedIn connection in an online social network. 
Furthermore, I collected LinkedIn public profile of all individuals who endorsed the 
entrepreneurs in the dataset. 
Variable specifications 
Individual-Level variables 
I use three individual level variables in the analysis 1) education, 2) local tie-
proportion, and 3) location stickiness. Graduate education is a binary indicator variable 
that has a value of one if the entrepreneur has a graduate degree. Tie-proportion measures 
the percentage of endorsement ties in the location of current job. For each entrepreneur, 
this measure is simply the ratio of the number of endorsement ties in a given location 
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divided by the total number of endorsement ties. I measure current location stickiness as 
the cumulative work experience in the current location. For entrepreneurs that change 
locations from their previous job and start a company (either immediately or after a short-
term job (duration less than 1 year), I measure previous location stickiness as the 
cumulative work experience in previous location. 
Metro-level variables 
Average funding averages the investment-funding amount per year for the 68 
metropolitan areas. Total funding rounds count the number of funding rounds per year in 
each metropolitan area. Patents equal the total number of patents per year in a given 





Descriptive statistics for Nascent Entrepreneurs (total N = 551) 
 Austin Boston Silicon Valley New York 
         
Variables mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Individual-
level 
        
Tie-
Proportion 




Last Job (Yrs) 





8.32 7.98 6.94 7.15 7.33 7.43 6.00 6.06 










6.57 7.26 7.94 5.01 7.91 5.79 8.30 6.47 
Patents(1-yr 
lag) 
2912.22 2382.54 5241.99 3988.24 1035.94 1835.28 874.32 2012.95 
entrepreneurs 160  46  248  97  
Graduate 
Degree 
76  23  141  45  
Total jobs 763  197  1063  461  
 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Nascent Entrepreneurs 
Among the 975 nascent entrepreneurs in the dataset, 551 launched a startup in one 
of the four major technology startup hubs (Austin, Silicon Valley, Boston, New York). 
The 551 entrepreneurs in the analysis reported 2,484 jobs in their career. Among these 
entrepreneur jobs, 56 percent did not move and founded a startup in their existing MSA, 
30 percent moved and immediately founded a startup, and 14 percent moved and worked 




Using the same dataset of entrepreneurs as the analysis in chapter 2 (above), I 
separate the entrepreneurs who founded their startup in one of the four regions: Silicon 
Valley, Austin, Boston, and New York. For entrepreneurs in each location, I estimate the 
following mixed logit model9: 
𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑍𝑗𝑡−1|𝑓, 𝑗) = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗  (2) 
Where D is the observed binary decision of entrepreneur i to start a company in 
location j at time t that is a function of observable user (X) and location (Z) 
characteristics, which is conditional on user moving to a different location. Thus, I 
estimate three separate models with three different binary outcomes: 1) entrepreneur 
decides to start a company (vs. continue working) in the current location, 2) entrepreneur 
decides to move to a different location and immediately starts a company, and 3) 
entrepreneur decides to move to a different location (as employee) and start a company 
after a one-year delay (vs. continuing to work as employee beyond that time). 
As a robustness check, I also specified models using the Milken Institute Best-
Performing Cities Index10, which includes a variety of measures of metro-performance 
including job, wage, and GDP growth and high-tech industry growth. This metro-
performance index is a useful proxy for the overall economic strength of the greater 
metropolitan area. Metro-performance index is a suitable proxy because it is positively 
correlated with patents and negatively correlated with the unemployment rate while 
                                                 
9 The logit model is well-justified here because I model and interpret each outcome separately 
(independently). Individuals can choose to launch a startup multiple times in different time periods, and 
indeed some of the entrepreneurs in the database are serial entrepreneurs over their careers. Whether or not 
to launch a venture is a repeated, independent choice that individuals make at each job transition. 
Furthermore, I selected the logit model rather than the multinomial logit model (another valid option) 




removing multicollinearity. The beta estimates did not significantly change, reinforcing 
the results. 
Interview Data 
The interview data was collected as part of a larger research project on digital and 
mobile media entrepreneurship.11 One research objective of the project aimed to better 
understand networking activity and social capital formation among digital technology 
entrepreneurs. As a member of the research team, we conducted 45 semi-structured, in-
depth interviews with technology entrepreneurs, collected between 2015 and 2017. The 
interviews lasted 1-2 hours (on average) and included a section of questions about the 
role of social networks and network activity in the process of launching a startup. We 
used purposive sampling to attain variation in entrepreneur perspective, considering 
venture location, development stage (early stage to more mature ventures), type of 
business (creative content, professional or technical services etc.), genre (e.g., gaming, 
education, entertainment, health, productivity, social, etc.).  
Table 10 reports the geographic and demographic characteristics of the 
entrepreneurs that were interviewed. Due to availability and limited travel funds, over 
half of the entrepreneurs were from Austin, but many were located in other metropolitan 
areas such as Silicon Valley/San Francisco, New York City, Chicago, Washington D.C., 
and St. Louis. Moreover, many of the entrepreneurs had lived in multiple locations and 
were quite familiar with the entrepreneurial ecosystems in each location. Pseudonyms of 
entrepreneurs and their ventures are used throughout to assure privacy and 
confidentiality. 
  
                                                 
11 Dr. Wenhong Chen is the principle investigator (PI) on the project. 
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Demographic Distribution of Entrepreneur Interviewees (N=45) 
  
Count Percentage 
Location Austin 31 69% 
 
Silicon Valley/SF Bay Area 5 11% 
 
Washington DC 3 7% 
 
New York City 3 7% 
 
Chicago 2 4% 
 
St. Louis 1 2% 
Gender Male 34 76% 
 
Female 11 24% 
Race/Ethnicity White 35 78% 
 
Asian 6 13% 
 
Black 3 7% 
 
Latino 1 2% 
Age 30-39 20 44% 
 
40+ 16 36% 
 




Table 10: Demographic Distribution of Entrepreneur Interviewees (N=45) 
Based on analysis of all 45 interviews, the responses captured important 
descriptions about structural and cultural factors of local ecosystems and how they relate 
to entrepreneur social capital formation. The entrepreneur responses were particularly 
valuable in comparing the structures and culture within different ecosystems. In turn, I 
analyze the entrepreneur interviews and report findings on the important structural 
elements of the ecosystems more generally, as well as location-specific characteristics of 
the ecosystems for the selected case studies (Austin, San Francisco, Boston, New York).  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 11 presents the estimated beta coefficients of logistic regressions for 
entrepreneurs in Austin, Silicon Valley, Boston, and New York who decided to remain in 
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the same location and start a company. To facilitate the interpretations in the text below, I 
report the odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients). For each of the four locations in the 
analysis, I separated entrepreneurs by where they launched a startup and fit a separate 
logistic regression model. I picked separate logit models because each entrepreneur in the 
group could be intrinsically different and thus the coefficients could have different 
significance. The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is a binary indicator of entrepreneur 
starting a company in the same location.  
The tie-proportion estimates for entrepreneurs in Austin and Silicon Valley (in 
Table 11, models 1 and 3) are positive and significant for entrepreneurs who start a 
company in their current location. For persons in Austin and Silicon Valley, this indicates 
that entrepreneurs are more likely to start a company in their present location if their tie-
proportion in that location is high, suggesting that ties play an important role in 
supporting entrepreneurs. Interpreting the model for Austin, for a 0.1 increase in the tie-
proportion in a location, ceteris paribus, the odds of an entrepreneur starting a company 
increase by a factor of 1.20 and this estimate is statistically significant (p<0.001). 
Interpreting the model for Silicon Valley, for a 0.1 increase in the tie-proportion in a 
location, ceteris paribus, the odds of an entrepreneur starting a company increase by a 
factor of 1.11 and this estimate is statistically significant (p<0.001). This suggests that 
social networks in Austin and Silicon Valley are an important factor in retaining potential 
entrepreneurs to start a company in the near future. Entrepreneurs embedded or “plugged-
in” the Austin and Silicon Valley ecosystems are more likely to stay in that location when 





Logistic regression estimates for entrepreneurs who started companies in same location 










(3)      
S.V. 
(4)         New 
York 
Grad Degree -0.137 -0.481 -0.141 0.038 
 
(0.253) (0.501) (0.202) (0.320) 
Cumulative Work Experience (Yrs) -0.013 -0.046 -0.072*** -0.110*** 
 
(0.021) (0.047) (0.022) (0.043) 
Tie-Proportion (current location) 1.789*** -1.320 1.042** 1.072 
 
(0.552) (1.042) (0.432) (0.681) 
Cumulative Work Experience in Current Location 0.087*** 0.142*** 0.115*** 0.193*** 
 
(0.025) (0.055) (0.024) (0.045) 
ln(Funding-Rounds Per Year)(1-yr lag) 0.697*** 0.170 0.486*** 0.052 
 
(0.170) (0.176) (0.088) (0.150) 
ln(Avg. Funding Per Year)(1-yr lag) -0.067 1.212 -0.014 0.119 
 
(0.063) (0.814) (0.057) (0.088) 
ln(Number of Patents)(1-yr lag) 0.311 1.037*** -0.389** -1.158** 
 
(0.193) (0.351) (0.187) (0.511) 
Constant -7.601*** -30.437** -2.708** 1.214 
 
(1.621) (14.188) (1.284) (3.351) 
Economic Controls (metro-performance index) yes yes yes yes 
Observations 709 178 922 414 
Note: (Odds Ratios reported in text) *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 11: Logistic regression estimates for entrepreneurs who started companies in same 
location (Non-Movers) by region 
One explanation is that Austin and Silicon Valley have multiple institutional 
structures and entrepreneurial environments that promote social tie formation and 
embeddedness in these locations. In one of the interviews, Yaser Masoudnia, an 
entrepreneur who moved from Washingtion D.C. to Silicon Valley, spoke about the 
environment being an important factor in building a support network and growing their 
business. 
“We were based in DC area. And we realized very soon—I think it was about six 
or seven months into the business—that we are in the wrong place, despite the 
fact that a lot of part of the business that we were doing was basically security 
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space and cyber security. We realized that if we want to make progress and make 
this business happening, we have to be in an environment with a network that 
nourished the start-ups and small businesses. That was the reason both of us 
moved from DC to basically Silicon Valley, and we start living here, working on 
the idea, going to different events, finding different people.” (Yaser Masoudnia) 
Descriptive indicators of the entrepreneurial ecosystems in Austin and Silicon 
Valley also lend support to this argument. Both Austin and Silicon Valley have a large 
number of incubators, accelerators, co-working spaces, social groups, and networking 
events targeting individuals with entrepreneurial ambitions. These formal organizations 
and informal groups frequently host networking events and activities on a weekly if not 
daily basis, thus increasing opportunities to interact (Startup Digest 2016). Frequency of 
interaction facilitates production and maintenance of close-knit networks (Blau 1964, 
Homans 1964). For example, Silicon Valley has dozens of well-known incubators 
including Y Combinator, Silicon Valley Innovation Center, 500 Startups, and Founders 
Space among many others.  
In the interviews with entrepreneurs, many reported that meetups facilitated tie 
formation. Meetup12 is a platform that enables local individuals to organize events around 
certain topics, ideas, activities, or groups. Although some entrepreneurs reported that they 
attend meetups for all types of activities and interests, many were characterizing their 
participation in meetups focused around startups and entrepreneurs. In another 
interviews, Joseph Dreyfus suggested that Meetups help entrepreneurs “find a community 
of people who have like interests and similar kind of expectations and ambitions.” 
The meetups can be geared towards entrepreneurs in general, but many are 
targeted towards specific subgroups based on interest or industry. For example, during 
field work for the analysis in this chapter, I attended meetups specifically targeting 
entrepreneurs interested in 3D printing, makers spaces, and crowdfunding on Kickstarter. 




Another entrepreneur interviewee, Alec Olsson, suggested that it can be challenging 
building ties in the San Francisco Bay area (Silicon Valley) where seemingly everybody 
is an entrepreneur or has ambitions of launching a startup. In this context, Alec reported 
that these specialized meetups can helpful in connecting with individuals that are more 
relevant to your needs and interests.  
“San Francisco is crazy, because it seems like everyone and their brother in this 
city is involved in a start-up. And it’s probably the one city I’ve been in in the 
world where when somebody asks you what you do for a living, if you say, “I 
work for a start-up,” it’s not of particular interest, and it’s completely cliché. And 
so networking becomes challenging because there is no novelty associated with it. 
It’s 100% expected to be associated with a start-up, and you have to find other 
ways and reasons to connect with people. So that can be industry specific. There 
are a bunch of industry specific meet-ups. There’s the 3D printing meet-up. 
There’s the advanced manufacturing meet-up. There’s hardware start-up meet-
ups, you know, where you can sort of form a cadre of like-minded, or at least like-
focused companies or start-up founders.” (Alec Olsson) 
Incubators are other structures within startup ecosystems that can facilitate 
entrepreneur social capital formation. Some incubators aim to develop new products or 
technologies, but the typical aim of these organizations is to nurture and develop 
entrepreneurial talent and to encourage startups. Most incubators offer many services 
such as office space, business supplies/services, entrepreneurship courses, 
advisor/mentors, consultants, and access to labs and equipment (Allen and McCluskey 
1991, Mian 1996). Some incubators offer small amounts of capital upon acceptance into 
the incubator. Also there are a few studies that suggest incubators help broker ties 
between entrepreneurs and key financial, technical, and social resources (Bøllingtoft and 
Ulhøi 2005, Totterman and Sten 2005). Some entrepreneurs I interviewed describe 
incubators as an alumni network of past members, who facilitated tie formation. 




“It’s been this kind of ever long fraternity, alumni, however you want to call it 
and we think very highly of the Techstars program. … We joined Techstars, 
which is now an international network of entrepreneurs and founders and mentors 
and while we completed that program in June of 2013 – or, sorry, we started it in 
June. I think we “graduated” in September or October for the – ever since we 
moved on, we still have – it’s like an alumni network. It’s like a modern day 
college in a sense and we still get a ton of value out of both helping other 
entrepreneurs and getting help ourselves.” (Devin Norris) 
Several entrepreneurs that had experience with incubators indicated that incubator 
personnel had established networks with first degree connections to key resources, 
particularly early seed capital investors. Alec Olsson reported: 
“First of all, from a fundraising perspective, you really—the only way you can 
effectively fundraise for venture capital is to have a good number of people in 
your network that know a good number of VCs and to get very strong personal 
introductions from the people in your network. And when we started the company 
in Madison, we literally knew nobody. So one of, you know, we paid—through 
our participation in Techstars—with a significant amount of equity in the 
company, and the thing we were buying with that equity was first and foremost 
access to the Techstars network … that would give us access to introductions to 
venture capitalists.” (Alec Olsson) 
In addition, Stanford University, an early champion of technology transfer and 
commercialization towards entrepreneurship, plays a big role in fostering the Silicon 
Valley startup ecosystem (Colyvas and Powell 2006). Similarly, in Austin, prominent 
incubators—including Capital factory, TechRanch, Techstars, Austin Technology 
Incubator, and Thinktiv—and The University of Texas at Austin also host many events in 
support of the Austin startup entrepreneurs. These events provide a forum for potential 
entrepreneurs to build network ties and access support structures and key resources for 
launching new ventures. 
In general, the responses suggested that participation in incubators was valuable 
to very early stage entrepreneurs with small stocks of social capital, particularly 
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entrepreneurs that recently arrived in a new location. For example, Joshua Serrano 
describes his experience arriving in Austin: 
“So when I first came here, I didn’t know anybody and all I had was the Capital 
Factory [incubator] basically as a place to kind of start plugging into different 
places. But I was – you know, within six months to a year, I was connected to a 
lot of very useful, successful, and cool people in Austin. And it didn’t – all it took 
was like me making them feel like I was really trying to do something positive for 
them to be like willing to help me and wanting to help me.” (Joshua Serrano) 
I find that “location stickiness”, meaning the cumulative time spent in a location, 
significantly influences entrepreneurs when choosing a startup location. The results show 
that the more time entrepreneurs remain in a location increases the likelihood that they 
establish a startup in that same location. Interpreting the estimate for Austin 
entrepreneurs in Table 11 (model 1), I see that a one-year increase in cumulative time 
spent in Austin increases the odds of starting a company in Austin by 1.09 (statistically 
significant at 99% level). For entrepreneurs in Boston, Silicon Valley, and New York 
(Table 11, models 2, 3, and 4), I find a one-year increase in cumulative time spent in a 
location increased the odds of starting a company in that location by 1.15, 1.12, and 1.21, 
respectively (all estimates statistically significant at 99% level). 
Regarding estimates for other individual-level factors, I find no statistically 
significant association between having a graduate degree and starting in company in the 
same location. In Boston and New York, I find a negative and significant association 
between overall cumulative work experience and entrepreneurs starting a company in the 
same location. For Boston and New York, a one-year increase in cumulative time in a 
location reduces the odds of starting a company in the same location by 0.069 and 0.104, 
respectively (estimates statistically significant at 99% level).  
Reporting findings for the metropolitan-level factors, I find a positive and 
significant association between the number of funding opportunities for startups in Austin 
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and Silicon Valley and entrepreneurs remaining in that location to start companies. For 
Austin and Silicon Valley (models 1 and 3 in Table 11), a 10 percent increase in the 
number of ln(funding rounds per year) increases the odds that entrepreneurs will stay in 
the same locations and start their companies by a factor of 1.07 and 1.05, respectively. 
The models also include a measure for the average funding amount per year, but the beta 
estimates were not statistically significant. This finding might stem from the type of 
industry prevalent each location. Austin and Silicon Valley produce a lot of information 
technology and software startups that have lower initial costs, thus large funding amounts 
may not be a primary concern at the initial stages. Moreover, although average funding 
amount and number of funding rounds are not strongly correlated (which is why they are 
simultaneously included in the model specifications), I tried removing funding rounds 
and leaving average funding rounds in the specification, but the results did not 
significantly change.  
Moreover, this finding is consistent with the chapter’s expectations based on 
numerous discussions with entrepreneurs and angel investors. In the interviews, 
entrepreneurs reported that they primarily seek small-to-medium sized investments from 
angel investors towards the beginning of the process and very few startups are equipped 
to appropriately utilize massive investment fusions that often come with steep growth 
targets that must be reached in a short period of time. Targeting large investment amounts 
is not a priority in the earliest phases of launching a company, although they might be 
relevant at a more mature phase. Thus during the startups’ nascent phase, potential 
entrepreneurs are likely to be attracted to a location that provides more opportunities for 
funding when compared to the amount of funding. As a result, entrepreneurs believe that 
the larger number of funding rounds in a location is an indicator of more opportunity for 
securing funding for their startup. Additionally, because startups are typically funded in 
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stages (Gompers and Lerner 2010), entrepreneurs likely associate more funding rounds in 
a location with a higher likelihood that their startup will continue to receive additional 
funding rounds beyond any initial investment capital. In short, for Austin and Silicon 
Valley, entrepreneurs tend to gravitate towards places where they have more opportunity 
for rounds of funding. 
Regarding patents, I find three statistically significant associations. For Boston 
entrepreneurs, a 10 percent increase in the ln(number of patents per year) increases the 
odds ratio of entrepreneurs staying in the same locations and starting companies by a 
factor of 1.11, and this estimate is statistically significant (p<0.01). Again, industry type 
might offer an explanation. Boston has many startups in the biotechnology sector, which 
require large upfront investments for new entrants. Patents are important in the 
biotechnology sector for potential entrepreneurs and investors due to the large startup 
costs. This finding aligns with the importance of biotechnology to the Boston startup 
ecosystem. Conversely, I find a significant and negative association in Silicon Valley and 
New York. For Silicon Valley and New York entrepreneurs, a 10 percent increase in the 
ln(number of patents per year) reduces the odds of entrepreneurs staying in the same 
locations and starting companies by a factor of 0.04 and 0.11, respectively (both 
estimates statistically significant (p<0.05)%. The estimate is not statistically significant 
for entrepreneurs in Austin. 
Next, I report estimates from Table 12 that present the estimated beta coefficients 
of logistic regressions for entrepreneurs who chose to change locations and start a 
company. In Table 12, the dependent variable is whether or not the entrepreneur moved 
to a different location and immediately started a company. The model specification is the 
same across all the models, except for the location stickiness variable. In Table 12, 
entrepreneurs change locations and the stickiness variable measures the cumulative work 
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experience in the previous location (prior to the startup location). For the models in Table 




Logistic regression estimates for entrepreneurs who started companies in different 










(3)        
S.V. 
(4)         
New York 
Grad Degree -0.115 -1.953 -0.286 -0.521 
 
(0.327) (0.848) (0.324) (0.539) 
Cumulative Work Experience (Yrs) 0.056*** 0.150*** 0.090*** 0.161*** 
 
(0.020) (0.053) (0.027) (0.050) 
Tie-Proportion in Previous Location -2.272*** -3.388** -4.624*** -0.739 
 
(0.701) (1.586) (0.864) (1.088) 
Cumulative Work Experience in Previous Location -0.029 -0.173** -0.043 -0.099* 
 
(0.030) (0.082) (0.031) (0.060) 
ln(Funding-Rounds Per Year)(1-yr lag) 0.344** 0.640** 1.096*** -0.164 
 
(0.166) (0.343) (0.237) (0.197) 
ln(Avg. Funding Per Year)(1-yr lag) -0.035 -0.332** 1.655** 0.156 
 
(0.059) (0.155) (0.725) (0.203) 
ln(Number of Patents)(1-yr lag) 0.783*** 1.459*** 0.054 -0.856 
 
(0.208) (0.545) (0.228) (0.546) 
Constant -8.995*** -11.489** -35.773*** -0.302 
 
(1.770) (4.652) (12.576) (4.671) 
Economic Controls (metro-performance index) yes yes yes yes 
Observations 709 178 922 414 
Note: (Odds Ratios reported in text) *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 12: Logistic regression estimates for entrepreneurs who started companies in 




Logistic regression estimates for entrepreneurs who started companies in different 










(3)      
S.V. 
(4)         
New York 
Grad Degree 0.010 20.263 0.031 -0.400 
 
(0.412) (750.499) (0.383) (0.749) 
Cumulative Work Experience (Yrs) 0.060** -0.001 0.098*** 0.200*** 
 
(0.024) (0.106) (0.025) (0.062) 
Tie-Proportion (new location) 1.802** -0.871 -0.942 -3.081 
 
(0.859) (2.472) (0.805) (1.759) 
Cumulative Work Experience in Previous Location -0.155*** -0.066 -0.173*** -0.123* 
 
(0.052) (0.144) (0.049) (0.074) 
ln(Funding-Rounds Per Year)(1-yr lag) 0.826** 1.027 1.530*** 1.177 
 
(0.335) (1.028) (0.467) (0.827) 
ln(Avg. Funding Per Year)(1-yr lag) -0.168 2.190 -0.452 0.144 
 
(0.113) (4.812) (0.353) (1.055) 
ln(Number of Patents)(1-yr lag) 0.507 0.894 -0.527 -1.002 
 
(0.330) (1.021) (0.427) (0.979) 
Constant -8.851*** -71.199 -3.277 -8.452 
 
(2.857) (748.095) (4.817) (17.286) 
Economic Controls (metro-performance index) yes yes yes yes 
Observations 709 178 922 414 
 Note: (Odds Ratios reported in text)t *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 13: Logistic regression estimates for entrepreneurs who started companies in 




As shown in Table 12, the tie-proportion estimates are negative and significant for 
entrepreneurs changing locations and immediately starting companies in Austin, Boston, 
and Silicon Valley. If an entrepreneur’s tie-proportion in their previous metropolitan area 
is high, the entrepreneur is less likely to immediately start a company after moving to a 
different location. This finding is consistent with expectations based on prior research. 
Social networks are important to launching startups because social capital allows the 
entrepreneurs to locate and mobilize important resources (e.g., initial seed funding, labor 
and human capital, strategic or technical expertise). Thus it is unlikely that entrepreneurs 
can launch new venture in a location where they have relatively few connections and 
support in the local community. 
Looking at entrepreneurs starting companies in Boston and New York in Table 
12, I see that a one-year increase in cumulative time in previous location reduces the odds 
of starting a company in Boston and New York by 0.16 and 0.09, respectively. The 
estimates for entrepreneurs in Austin and Silicon Valley were not statistically significant. 
I find having a graduate degree is not significantly associated with starting a company in 
a different location.  
In all four locations I find a positive and significant association between 
cumulative work experience in a location and entrepreneurs starting a company after 
changing locations. For Austin, Boston, Silicon Valley, and New York, a one-year 
increase in cumulative time in a location increases the odds of starting a company 
immediately after changing locations by 1.06, 1.16, 1.09, and 1.17, respectively. This 
finding is consistent with the literature on commitment. The longer someone spends 
working in a career field, the more committed they become to a particular career ladder. 
Consequently, they are less likely to sacrifice their gains and lifestyle towards a highly 
risky venture as an entrepreneur. This could suggest why many entrepreneurs are young, 
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often recent college graduates. However, the situation is different for individuals who 
change locations. Some individuals work quickly up the career ladder, often achieving 
high-status positions, yet remain professionally unfulfilled or experience a personal shock 
(e.g., divorce, death in family). Thus, they seek large changes like moving regions and 
seeking new experience, including risker career changes like starting their own company.  
For Austin, Boston, and Silicon Valley (models 1 and 3 in Table 12), a 10 percent 
increase in the ln(number of funding rounds per year) increases the odds ratio of the 
entrepreneur changing locations and starting a company immediately by 1.03, 1.07, and 
1.12, respectively (p<.05). Regarding patents, in Austin and Boston, I find a 10 percent 
increase in the ln(number of patents per year) increases the odds ratio of the entrepreneur 
changing locations and immediately starting a company in Austin and Boston by 1.08 and 
1.16, respectively, and these estimate are statistically significant (p<0.001).  
Lastly, I report estimates from Table 13 that present the estimated beta 
coefficients of logistic regressions for entrepreneurs who chose to change locations and 
start a company after working a short-term job. The dependent variable for Table 13 is 
whether or not the entrepreneur moved to a different location and started a company after 
a short delay (worked as an employee for a duration of one year or less before starting a 
company). To reiterate, the model specification is the same across all the models, except 
for the location stickiness variable. For the models in Table 13, this is the location of the 
job before the short-term job (because the short-term job is in the same location as the 
startup).  
I find that tie-proportion is important for entrepreneurs moving to Austin to start a 
company after working short-term in another job. For persons moving from another 
region to Austin, I find the higher the person’s tie-proportion in Austin the more likely 
the person will start a company in Austin after a short duration working as employee. 
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Interpreting model 1 in Table 13, for a 0.1 increase in the tie-proportion in a location, the 
odds of an entrepreneur starting a company in the new location after working for a short 
while increase by a factor of 1.20. This estimate is also statistically significant (p<0.05). 
However, this association was not significant for entrepreneurs moving to Silicon Valley, 
Boston, or New York. 
One explanation for this finding is the ease or pace at which newcomers can get 
plugged into crucial networks within the startup ecosystem in Austin. This stems from 
many of the characteristics of Austin’s ecosystem. For one, Austin’s startup ecosystem is 
much smaller than the ecosystems in Silicon Valley and New York City. Based on the 
interview responses from entrepreneurs, the entrepreneurial ecosystem in Austin is often 
described as decentralized with more accessible channels to key players and influencers 
in the ecosystem. The culture of Austin’s startup scene is also distinct, often described as 
friendly and collaborative, as I report from analysis of entrepreneur interviews. This is 
supported across multiple interviews with Austin entrepreneurs who have spent time in 
Silicon Valley, Boston, and other key cities. As one Austin entrepreneur moving from 
Silicon Valley puts it: 
“I think that in Austin, I mean – like compared to Silicon Valley, Austin startup 
culture has a very laid-back feel to it. Whereas I think you could look at the 
startup culture in Silicon Valley as very well defined, very, you know, ‘This is 
what a startup is supposed to look like’—everyone trying to be more disruptive to 
the industry. I don’t know how you translate that necessarily. I just think [Austin] 
has a little bit more collaborative culture. For example, we try very hard to 
collaborate with other industry providers in Austin.” (Jeff Smith) 
I find the estimates for location stickiness were negative and significant for all 
locations among entrepreneurs who move to a new location, work as an employee for a 
short while and then start a company. For Austin, Silicon Valley, and New York, a one-
year increase in cumulative time in a location reduces the odds of moving to another 
 
 117 
location by 0.14, 0.16, and 0.12, respectively. These estimates align with expectations 
from prior research suggesting some degree of geographic inertia or local stickiness. 
Entrepreneurs’ tend to become more attached to a location as their tenure in that location 
increases and therefore are less likely to move elsewhere to start a company (Dahl and 
Sorenson 2012).  
I find that having a graduate degree is not significantly associated with starting a 
company in a different location. For Austin, Silicon Valley, and New York, a one-year 
increase in cumulative work experience increases the odds of this occurring by 1.06, 
1.10, and 1.22, respectively (p<.05). 
For Austin and Silicon Valley (models 1 and 3 in Table 13), a 10 percent increase 
in the number of funding rounds per year increases the odds ratio of the entrepreneur 
working a short-term job, and then starting a company by a factor of 1.09 and 1.17, 
respectively. All these estimates are statistically significant (p<0.001). For Boston and 
New York, the estimates were positive but not statistically significant. 
As explained above, I find a positive and significant influence of an 
entrepreneur’s tie-proportion on their likelihood to start a company in a location. 
However, one might suggest that evolution of tie-proportion in a location be correlated 
with an individual’s tenure in that location. While I do not have time series data on the 
evolution of social networks, I address this concern by testing the results by simulating 
the tie-proportion in a metropolitan area based on entrepreneurs’ tenures in current and 
past locations. The dynamic tie-proportion in this chapter is created the same way as 
described in chapter 2 (above).  
A well-documented finding in the literature is that relationships are more likely to 
develop between co-located persons. In many social contexts, the likelihood of any tie 
formation decreases rapidly as the physical distance separating two parties increases 
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(Bossard 1932, Kono et al. 1998b, Sorenson and Stuart 2001). At the dyadic level, co-
location increases the likelihood of interaction between two parties and there is a 
tendency toward mutuality in relations over time because of the social pressure to 
reciprocate interactions (Gouldner 1960). Because tie-proportion is simply the 
connections in a location divided by the total connections in all locations, a dynamic 
conception of entrepreneurs’ tie-proportion is a function of the tenure in current and past 
locations. Formally, this new dynamic measure of tie-proportion is:  
 
𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑗𝜏 =
𝑛𝑖𝑗 ∗ ( ∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡∈[0,𝜏] )/(∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡∈[0,𝑇] )
∑ (𝑛𝑖𝑗 ∗ (∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡∈[0,𝜏] )/(∑ 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡∈[0,𝑇] ))𝑗
 
Here, td is the time varying tie-proportion of an individual, t is a dummy 
representing a unit of time spent in location j by individual i, n the observed number of 
ties of individual i in location j, and τ represents the time period in consideration. Thus, I 
converted the static view of tie-proportion per location into a time varying dynamic tie-
proportion panel. I find that that such panel of tie-proportion does not affect the results in 
any significant way, thus reinforcing the findings reported above. 
CONCLUSION 
Technology regions are continually being transformed by entrepreneurship. This 
study investigated four prominent entrepreneurial ecosystems in the U.S. that have been 
explored in the massive literature on regional advantage. I examined location-specific 
variation in the influence of social networks, funding opportunities, and economic factors 
on entrepreneur location choices. I provided measures for operationalizing the 
technopolis wheel, a conceptual model designed to show institutional structures which 
are important for technology regions to develop and continue to re-invent themselves.  
Moreover, the supplementary analysis of interviews from entrepreneurs from Austin and 
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Silicon Valley highlighted structural and cultural aspects of particular entrepreneurial 
ecosystems. These responses offered potential explanations for some of the location-
specific variation in the influence of social networks, funding opportunities, and 
economic factors on entrepreneur location choice. 
This study shows the importance of studying education, cumulative work 
experience and the proportion of ties when investigating why entrepreneurs stay or move 
to particular locations to launch technology startups. One empirical finding is that social 
networks in Austin and Silicon Valley are an important factor in retaining potential 
entrepreneurs. Additional support for this finding was reported in the interviews with 
entrepreneurs in Austin and Silicon Valley. Entrepreneur responses support the 
explanation that these locations have strong institutional structures that promote the 
creation of social ties and thus increasing one’s embeddedness in these locations. 
Entrepreneurs consistently reported on particular structures within entrepreneurial 
ecosystems that were central to them building their social network including social 
groups/clubs, Meetsups, startup/entrepreneur-centric events, and incubators. It was clear 
from several interviews that social groups and meetups played an important role in 
entrepreneur tie formation. Institutional structures are important in fostering network ties, 
which impact entrepreneurs’ ability to access and mobilize the resources necessary to 
launch new ventures. 
Furthermore, the ease or pace at which newcomers can get plugged into crucial 
networks could be an important factor in creating or sustaining a healthy startup 
ecosystem. For persons moving from another region to Austin, I find the higher the 
person’s tie-proportion in Austin the more likely the person will start a company in 
Austin after a short duration working as an employee. Based on the interviews, it is 
plausible that this finding stems from many of the characteristics of Austin’s distinct 
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ecosystem. For one, Austin’s startup ecosystem is much smaller than the Silicon Valley 
and New York. Several interview responses characterize the entrepreneurial ecosystem in 
Austin as more decentralized with more accessible channels to key players and 
influencers in the Austin ecosystem. Based on the interviews, this environment could be 
derived from Austin’s distinct culture, which was often described as more friendly and 
collaborative relative to the ecosystems in Silicon Valley, Boston, and New York. This is 
supported across multiple interviews with Austin entrepreneurs who have spent time in 
Silicon Valley, Boston, and other key cities. 
I also found that the number of funding rounds per year, or frequency of 
opportunities for funding in a location, seems to influence whether or not an 
entrepreneurs move elsewhere to start a venture. I should note that it is the number of 
rounds rather than the average funding amount per year that appears to influence 
entrepreneur location choices. More research is needed to help validate this finding in the 
analysis. Once corroborated with additional research studies, this finding could be very 
important to state and city policy makers. City officials might consider policies that 
encourage the organization of angel networks, which fund more seed investment rounds 
relative to the large capital infusions by venture capital firms (e.g. series A, series B, 
series C). These policies might include financial and other regulatory incentives. This 
seems particularly relevant to declining industrial metropolitan areas with stagnating 
local economies, which are striving to encourage local entrepreneurship and retain local 
talent that is flowing to cities like the San Francisco Bay Area, Austin, Boston, and New 
York City. Access to sufficient investment is widely perceived, in the entrepreneurial 
community, to be the dominant impediment to startup success. Thus, future studies 
should further test this association, perhaps exploring potential moderating factors that 
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